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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW and
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Issue: Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in determining
the reasonableness of the billing rate of Mr. Jensen when the trial court (1) disallowed the
affidavits submitted by three large law firms on the grounds that the overhead expenses of
such large law firms may be greater than those of Mr. Jensen, who is a solo practitioner;
(2) failed to understand the billing rates for non-court time and court time as used by the
attorney who submitted an affidavit and on which the trial court relied for its ruling; and
(3) failed to allow any increase in Mr. Jensen's billing rate during the nearly five years
over which the subject litigation spanned. This issue arises from the final order and
judgment entered by the trial court and is therefore appealable as provided by Rule 4,
Utah R. App. P. It was preserved by timely filing a notice of appeal
Standard of Review: The question of whether the correct legal standard was
applied is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
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2. Issue: Whether the trial court's determination of the amount of billable time
allowed to Appellant's attorney was appropriate and reasonable. This issue arises from
the final order and judgment entered by the trial court and is therefore appealable as
provided by Rule 4, Utah R. App. P. It was preserved by timely filing a notice of appeal.
Standard of Review: The standard of review of the amount of a trial court's
award of attorney fees is generally patent error or clear abuse of discretion. See e.g, Keith
Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UTApp 128, Pll, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
(citation omitted). See also, Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268
(Utah 1992). However, the amount and reasonableness of a trial court's award of
attorney fees is ordinarily a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given set of facts, i.e., it is a mixed
question of law and fact. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1996);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine,
830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988). See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, %l, 977 P.2d 1201; Taylor
ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, %6, 977 P.2d 479.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
The initial trial court proceedings began as a breach of contract case that flowed from
prior litigation between the parties.1 After more than three years of hostile and bitter
litigation, the parties entered into a Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement").2
However, Mr. Blevins concocted a plan to thwart the Agreement by attempting to divert
to his friend the very funds that he was required, by the terms of the Agreement, to turn
over to Custom Steel, et al He did this by instigating a garnishment action to garnish the
funds that he was holding for Custom Steel, et al.
Mr. Blevins' garnishment action was defeated, but Custom Steel, et al incurred
substantial legal fees. Custom Steel, et al then commenced an action against Mr. Blevins3
for breach of the Agreement and to recover the legal fees incurred in defending against
1

The parties are many. They include a corporation, Custom Steel Fabrication,
and six individuals, all of whom were related to each other. The Appellants in this appeal
represent only four of the individuals. Custom Steel and two individuals, Heidi Bishop
and Mark Garamendi, were dismissed from the case. (R. 173-74). For convenience, the
three dismissed parties are referred to herein as "Custom Steel, et al" Following their
dismissal, the trial court awarded to them $ 1,330 in attorney fees, the exact amount
requested by their counsel. (R. 192-95, 204, 208).
2

In 1995, Mr. Blevins loaned money to Custom Steel Fabrication at a 48%
interest rate. Following default by Custom Steel and judgment against it, Mr. Blevins
seized equipment from Custom Steel. During the seizure, he allegedly assaulted
Heidi Bishop and wrongfully seized personal property belonging to her and
Mr. Garamendi. Further litigation ensued. The Agreement was to resolve all claims
between the parties.
3

Although Mr. Blevins was the principal actor, his wife was included in the action
because she was also a party to the Agreement.
-3-

the contrived garnishment action. In that action, Appellees failed to timely file a
counterclaim. Undaunted, Appellees commenced a separate breach of contract action
against Custom Steel, et al and in doing so added the four Appellants herein. Based on
the doctrine of res judicata, the trial court dismissed Custom Steel, et al from the case.
(R. 173-75). The remaining defendants, comprising the four Appellants herein, were then
left to defend against four separate causes of action.
Through summary judgment Appellants prevailed on all four causes of action.
Appellants also defeated a motion for summary judgment brought by Appellees. Id.
Since the Agreement provides attorney fees to the prevailing party (R. 288, 485 ^4),
and since Appellants prevailed, the trial court awarded attorney fees to Appellants.
Judgment I at 4; (R. 484-86); Addendum 1 at 2 f4. Appellants then submitted affidavits
of fees, (R. 441-44, 465-67), including detailed billing records, (R. 445-53).
Affidavits from Appellants' counsel supported a request for $11,538. Without
entering any findings to support a reduction in fees, the trial court entered an award of
attorney fees in the amount of $6,050. Judgment I; (R. 484-86); Addendum 1 at 3. More
puzzling, the trial court's final order and judgment included the following paragraph:
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor
of Defendants on the First Cause of Action and now by granting
summary judgment on all remaining causes of action, and after
reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by Defendants and
finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and . . .
Judgment I at 3; (R. 486); Addendum 1 at 3 {emphasis added)
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Judgment I was entered on February 1, 2002. (R. 484-86); Addendum 1. Based on
the trial court's substantial reduction in the amount of attorney fees and based on the trial
court's failure to provide anyfindingsto support such reduction, Appellants thenfiledon
February 27, 2002 their First Notice of Appeal (R. 491-92).
Despite extensive steps to collect Judgment I,4 and after Appellants made repeated
requests over four months, the trial court denied without comment Appellants' request for
$2,107 in attorney fees ("Judgment II") (R. 628-29). Appellants then filed their Second
Notice of Appeal (R. 630-31). Subsequently, both appeals were consolidated by this
Court. (R. 639).
On August 5, 2004, this Court issued its Amended Memorandum Decision
("Blevins i")5 (R. 671-73);6 Addendum 2. In Blevins I, this Court reversed the trial court,
awarded attorney fees on appeal and remanded to the trial court for a determination of
attorney fees consistent with this Court's decision.
4

Appellees' attempts to defeat the collection of Judgment I, included a Motion to
Quash Supplemental Order (4/1/2003), (R. 506-511), and a Notice of Supersedeas Bond
(4/11/2002). (R. 526-27). At the supp order hearing, the trial court ordered a $200 bail on
a bench warrant for Mr. Blevins because of Mr. Blevins' failure to appear as ordered.
(R. 575-76). Appellants filed the following: Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees'
Motion to Quash Supplemental Order (3/29/2002) (R. 500-04), and a Motion for
Protective Order (4/8/2002) (R. 517-18).
5

This Court first issued its Memorandum Decision without an award of attorney
fees on appeal. Appellants were compelled to file a Petition for Rehearing. This Court
then issued its Amended Memorandum Decision that included an award of attorney fees
on appeal.
6

This Court sent Blevins I to the trial court on October 7, 2004 along with this
Court's Remititur.
-5-

On Remand
On remand, the trial court took more than 9 months to render a decision on the
amount of attorney fees to award.7 No evidentiary hearings were held in the trial court,
but Appellants submitted additional affidavits of attorney fees. At the request of the trial
court, (R. 793), the parties submitted affidavits from local attorneys to establish a
reasonable billing rate for Mr. Jensen, counsel for Appellants. In addition to affidavits,
the parties submitted memoranda in support or in opposition to the fees sought. As of
February 28, 2005, the amount sought by Appellants was $28,540 (R. 790); Addendum 5.
Billing rates for Mr. Jensen ranged from a beginning rate of $175 per hour in 2000 to
$200 per hour in the period 2002 through 2004.8
The trial court awarded $575.97 in costs on appeal for Blevins /and $11,665 in
attorney fees and costs for (1) the trial phase; (2) the post-judgment collection phase;
(3) the appeal; and (4) the fees incurred on remand to defend all of the fees sought.
(R. 847); Addendum 1 at 7. That is, out of the $28,540 sought by Appellants as of
February 28, 2005, the trial court awarded only $12,240, or less than 43%. And, such
award does not include the additional work expended subsequent to February 28, 2005,
and which work was ordered or necessitated by the trial court.

7

The Remittitur was filed in the trial court on October 7, 2004, and the trial
court's order and judgment was entered on July 22, 2005.
8

Mr. Jensen's billing rate increased to $210 per hour in the Spring of 2005.
-6-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was instructed by this Court to make on remand findings of fact to
support an award of attorney fees for the trial phase, the post-trial phase, the appellate
phase, and the fees incurred on remand. (R. 671-73); Addendum 2. But the trial court
failed to make any findings of fact and expressly stated that there are "no facts" in this
case. (R. 695). The trial court then instructed the parties to submit affidavits from local
attorneys to establish the customary billing rates for attorneys with 4-9 years of practice.
(R. 793); Addendum 6. Appellees submitted two affidavits from solo practitioners.
(R. 822-27); Addendum 8. Appellants submitted three affidavits from large law firms.
(R. 798-812); Addendum 7. However, the trial court rejected the affidavits from large
law firms on the basis that such law firms have greater overhead expenses than a solo
practitioner. (R. 841-47); Addendum 3.
The trial court erred as a matter of law by applying a new factor in the determination
of billing rates when it excluded the affidavits from three large law firms based simply on
their overhead expenses. The trial court also erred when it failed to comprehend the
distinction between "court work" and "non-court work" as those terms were used by one
of the solo practitioner affiants and upon which the trial court relied in setting a billing
rate for Mr. Jensen. The trial court also erred when it failed to allow any increase in
billing rates from 2000 to 2005, although the trial court in its instructions to the parties
requested affidavits to cover billing rates for attorneys with 4-9 years of practice, clearly
contemplating differing rates with more years of practice.
-7-

After applying the minimum billing rate of $125 per hour from two solo practitioners,
the trial court then stepped through the various groups of pleadings to opine the number
of hours that the trial court believed to be reasonable for each group. In doing so, the trial
court merely stated the number of pages in such pleadings and sometimes the number of
legal citations. The trial court appeared to give little or no weight to the amount of time
required to assemble facts contained in those pleadings or to prepare supporting
affidavits.
Although the trial court itemized groups of legal work, it failed to identify any
pleadings that were unnecessary to the litigation. The trial court also failed to accept
affidavits from large law firms, and in particular the affidavit of Mr. Orton of
Kirton & McConkie, based solely on the overhead expenses inherent in large law firms.
(R. 841-47); Addendum 3. But Mr. Orton's affidavit in particular provides a professional
opinion on the reasonableness of the billing rates of Mr. Jensen and the reasonableness of
the time spent by Mr. Jensen on the pleadings, including the appellate brief in Blevins I.
(R. 798-812); Addendum 7.
The trial court relied exclusively on the Record for its determination of fees.
Therefore, this Court is not disadvantaged in any way to review the Record below in
determining the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought by Appellants. And,
Appellants urge this Court not to grant any deference to the trial court's ruling on the
amount of attorney time that was reasonable. This Court has the entire record on which
the trial court relied to opine on the reasonableness of the amount of time billed.
-8-

Based on the professional opinion of Mr. Orton, the trial court should have found that
the amount of time and amount of fees billed by Mr. Jensen were reasonable. There was
no controverting evidence in the record. In effect, the trial court erred as a matter of law
and abused its discretion by awarding an unreasonable amount of time to award for all of
the legal work performed by Mr. Jensen and for not weighing the evidence presented.

ARGUMENT
As a beginning matter, Appellants first express their concern with the overall
approach and tone of the trial court's determination of attorney fees. Appellants believe
that an objective observer would conclude that the trial court may have retaliated against
Appellants, and perhaps Mr. Jensen. Instead of examining for reasonableness the
attorney fees sought by Appellants, the trial court appears to have taken upon itself to
minimize such fees by both minimizing the hourly billing rate allowed for Mr. Jensen,
and then minimizing the amount of time, in the opinion of the trial court, that each block
of work should have taken. But even the minimal approach taken by the trial court
appears to be unrealistic and unreasonable.
The word "reasonable" means to be "not excessive" or "not unjust" or "moderate" or
"sensible."9 It also means "fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances."10 The

9

10

See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1502 (2d ed.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (7th ed.

-9-

1999)

1980)

word does not mean "minimal" or "the least possible." But it appears that on remand the
trial court attempted to minimize the award of attorney fees. Utah's appellate courts have
never required nor suggested that attorney fees should be the least possible. Instead, they
should be "reasonable" (meaning not excessive) when compared with what other
attorneys in the same community charge for similar services.
The approach taken by the trial court in this case, if allowed to stand, will
undoubtedly have a chilling effect on attorneys and on parties whose contracts contain
fee-shifting provisions. The intent of fee-shifting provisions is to make the prevailing
party whole. Such intent, however, is thwarted when a trial court takes a minimalist's
approach rather than a reasonable approach. The prevailing party is not made whole
despite the intent of the parties.
The trial court has now twice undermined the contractual intent of the parties by first
in Blevins /, without comment, halving the attorney fees and now again in Blevins II
awarding less than 43% of the fees sought.
It is in this light that Appellants seek this Court's review of the trial court's ruling,
order and judgment. There are also ancillary issues for this Court to review that have
adversely affected the amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial court. For example,
the trial court would not honor Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P., and it failed entirely to
comply with the requirements of Rule 58B, Utah R. of Civil P.

-10-

ISSUE NO. 1:
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in
determining the reasonableness of the billing rate of Mr. Jensen when
the trial court (1) disallowed the affidavits submitted by three large law
firms on the grounds that the overhead expenses of such large law firms
may be greater than those of Mr. Jensen, who is a solo practitioner;
(2) failed to understand the billing rates for non-court time and court
time as used by the attorney who submitted an affidavit and on which
the trial court relied for its ruling; and (3) failed to allow any increase
in Mr. Jensen's billing rate during the nearly five years over which the
subject litigation spanned.

I.

The trial court erred when it (a) disallowed the affidavits submitted by three
large law firms: (b) incorrectly applied the wrong hourly rate for non-court
time: and (c) failed to allow any increase in rates over the span of five years.
On two prior occasions in these proceedings the trial court found no problem with the

billing rate of Mr. Jensen.11 Despite the trial court's earlier approval of Mr. Jensen's billing
rate of $175 per hour, on remand the trial court directed the parties to submit "affidavits
from other attorneys to establish the billing rates for attorneys with four years of practice12 to

11

On May 18, 2001, the trial court in its Minute Entry approved Mr. Jensen's
Second Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees, (R. 208), which fees were billed at the rate
of $175 per hour (R. 193). And on February 1, 2002, the trial court's final order and
judgment in Blevins I expressly stated that Mr, Jensen's fees were reasonable. (R. 486).
12

It is curious why the trial court started the range with "four years" since
Mr. Jensen had been practicing for five years when he filed his first pleading in this case.
-11-

nine years of practice in the areas of breach of contract and collection matters." (R. 793);
Addendum 6.
In response to the trial court's request, Appellants submitted three affidavits from
partners or shareholders of large law firms operating in the Salt Lake City area.
(R. 798-812); Addendum 7. The three affidavits are from Kent B. Alderman, Parsons Behle
&Latimer; John G. Weston, Snell & Wilmer; and R. Willis Orton, Kirton & McConkie. Id.

Mr. Alderman's affidavit states in part the following:

"Our firm customarily charges the following billing rates based on an
attorney's years of experience:
4 years at $170;13 5 years at $180; 6 years at $185; 7 years at $190;
8 years at $200; and 9 years at $210."
Alderman Aff. at 2; (R. 800-01); Addendum 7 at 3-4.

Mr. Weston's affidavit states in part the following:

"The Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. Salt Lake City office customarily charges
hourly billing rates between $190 and $240 for attorneys with four to
eight years of experience practicing law."
Weston Aff.atl;

(R. 802-03); Addendum 7 at 5-6.

13

The trial court's Order and Judgment incorrectly states that Mr. Alderman's
affidavit shows $120 per hour for a four-year associate. Perhaps it was a typographical
mistake or a reflection of the trial court's approach to find a minimum billing rate.
-12-

Mr. Orton's affidavit states in part the following:
"From the documents I was provided, I took note of the various
hourly rates charged by Mr. Jensen during the course of the litigation as
reflected on Exhibits A and B [of this affidavit], and noted that they
ranged from between $175 to $200 per hour and have continued through
today at the current rate of $200. I particularly noted that lawyers
associated with mv law firm and similar lengths of experience
(vis.. 1995 or 1996 law school graduates) charged similar rates for the
same relevant period of time.
"In determining the reasonableness of the $175 to $200 hourly
rates charged by Mr. Jensen, I note that Mr. Jensen graduated with a
Bachelor's degree from the University of Utah, and with an MBA
degree from Harvard University. Following a successful business
career, Mr. Jensen graduated cum laude from Boston College Law
School in 1995, and he began practice in Utah in 1995."
Orton Aff at 5; (R. 808); Addendum 7 at 11 {emphasis added).
Appellees submitted two affidavits from solo practitioners. The affidavit of
Russell D. Hartill states in part the following:
"I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah since
May 17, 2000. I graduated with a JD degree in May of 1996 from the
University of Idaho. I am currently engaged in private practice dealing
with breach of contract and collection matters, among other issues.
"My billing rate for such matters is $125 per hour for non-court
appearances and $ 175 per hour for courtroom work. My rates have not
changed since May 17, 2000. Included with this affidavit is a copy of
my legal representation agreement which states mv rates. My practice is
that of a sole practitioner, with no affiliations with any other attorneys
and I am located at 140 W 9000 S, Sandy, Utah."
Hartill Aff. at 1-2; (R. 822-23); Addendum 8 at 1-2 {emphasis added).

-13-

With respect to his billing rates, Mr. Hartill's "Legal Representation Agreement,"
attached to his affidavit, contains the following:
'The rate of $125 per hour for matters not related to court preparation
and the rate of $ 175 per hour for court preparation and appearances."
HartillAff. at 3; (R. 824); Addendum 8 at 3 {emphasis added).
The affidavit of Philip A. Reichenbach states in part the following:
"I have practiced for over six years, having been admitted to the Utah
Bar on October 20, 1998. My practice has included several collection
matters and several cases alleging breach of contract.... I have billed
clients between $120 and $165 per hour for my time. The
overwhelming majority of my time is billed at $125 per hour."
Reichenbach Aff. at 1-2; (R. 826-27); Addendum 8 at 5-6.
A. The trial court erred when it disallowed the affidavits from the three large
firms on the grounds that the overhead expenses of large firms are greater
than those of a solo practitioner.
The trial court acknowledged receipt of the affidavits from the large law firms, but it
disallowed them, stating:
"There is no question that the billing rates contained in the affidavits
submitted by Mr. Jensen must be viewed in light of the organization of
the offices which submitted them. Large law firms, and especially
national lawfirms,have large overhead/expenses. Mr. Jensen would not
have such expenses. As noted in his filings, he worked out of his
home."14
Order and Judgment at 2 (R. 842); Addendum 3 at 2.
14

The trial court had no basis to conclude that Mr. Jensen only worked out of his
home. Throughout all of these proceedings, Mr. Jensen maintained a separate and formal
law office in the Kearns Building. The Record is void of any support to the notion
conveyed by the trial court in its ruling.
-14-

The trial court then proceeded to apply the billing rates from the two solo
practitioners submitted by Appellees. Although the trial court did not identify which of
the two affidavits submitted by Appellees that it used, or both, it seems quite clear that it
primarily relied on the Hartill affidavit. This conclusion is reached because Mr. Hartill's
affidavit is the only affidavit submitted to the trial court that delineates hourly rates
between "court work" and "non-court work," and the trial court also delineated the hourly
rates into those same categories: "none-court time" and "court time." (R. 842);
Addendum 3 at 2.
The trial court stated the following:
"The Court determines that the rates charged by the solo practitioners
are consistent with the rates customarily charged for similar services and
by attorneys in similar situations, and therefore awards Mr. Jensen $125
an hour for non-court time and $175 an hour for court time."
(R. 842); Addendum 3 at 2 (emphasis added).
First, the trial court appears to be referencing the two solo practitioners whose
affidavits were submitted by Appellees when it states "the rates charged by the solo
practitioners." Id. (emphasis added). But then the trial court seems to be comparing the
rates charged by those two solo practitioners with the "rates customarily charged for
similar services." That is, the trial court leaps without any other evidence to the
conclusion that the rates of the two solo practitioners are consistent with the rates other
attorneys charge without defining who those other attorneys are. In effect, the trial court
relied exclusively on the two affidavits submitted by Appellees to determine what is
-15-

customary and what rates should apply to Mr. Jensen. In contrast, the affidavits
submitted by the three large law firms would have by their very nature represented scores
of attorneys, not just two attorneys.
Second, the trial court appears to have confused the term "similar services" with
"similar situations." This came about in a bizarre and disconnected way.
The trial court first cited Dixie State Bank v. Bracken (764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)
(R. 841); Addendum 3 at 1. The trial court then set forth the first factor it considered:
"1. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily
charged in the locality for similar services?''
Id. {emphasis added).
While the factor is stated correctly, the trial court added a new factor not previously
set forth in Dixie nor in any other Utah case. The factor "similar services" is intended to
be used in comparing billing rates between attorneys who are or have provided similar
legal services for their clients. There has never been any attempt to compare the overhead
expenses of attorneys or their "situations." Such an approach would take the legal
profession down a slippery slope. It would also imply that the greater the overhead of an
attorney, the greater the billing rate that could be justified. But that would be adverse to
the public interest and contrary to the purpose behind the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct. See e.g., Rule 1.5, Utah R. Prof. Conduct.
The trial court should have accepted the affidavits from the three large law firms.
There was no legally cognizable basis for ignoring them. Such affidavits also provide to
-16-

the trial court a range of hourly rates across years of practice, which is precisely what the
trial court directed the parties to submit. The trial court erred by not including those
affidavits. Had the trial court accepted and relied on the affidavits from large firms, the
trial court could not reasonably have concluded that $175 per hour was an unreasonable
billing date for Mr. Jensen, which is the net result of the trial court's award of only $125
per hour. The trial court reached such a conclusion based only on two affidavits from two
solo practitioners.
B. The trial court erred when it failed to understand the billing rates for noncourt time and court time as those terms were used by one attorney upon
whose affidavit the trial court relied for its ruling.
The trial court also failed to understand the difference between "court time" and
"non-court time" as used by Mr. Hartill in his affidavit. Although the language in
Mr, HartiU's affidavit could have been more clear, he expressly referenced and attached
his "Legal Representation Agreement." His fee agreement clarifies his billing rates:
"The rate of $125 per hour for matters not related to court preparation
and the rate of $175 per hour for court preparation and appearances."
(R. 824); Addendum 8 at 3 {emphasis added).
The trial court, however, allowed $175 per hour only for actual "court-room work."
(R. 846) Addendum 3 at 6. Had the trial court examined Mr. HartiU's "Legal
Representation Agreement," it would have seen that Mr. Hartill charges $175 per hour for
"court preparation and appearances." That is, Mr. Hartill would have charged $175 per
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hour for all of the work in this particular case. For whatever reasons, the trial court failed
to observe this critical information, or, as suggested in the preamble to Appellants'
Argument, the trial court attempted at every possible turn to minimize the amount of
attorney fees instead of examining them for reasonableness.
Had the trial court properly understood the billing rate of Mr. Hartill, the trial court
would have applied the $175 per hour billing rate for the work done in these proceedings,
or at least during the first year of these proceedings with an allowance for increases in
subsequent years. Instead, the trial court applied only $125 for all but 6.8 hours of
work.15 (R. 847). This simple but substantial error resulted in a reduction of $4,190 in
the amount of fees awarded.16
C. The trial court also erred when it failed to allow any increase in
Mr. Jensen's billing rate during the nearly five years over which the subject
litigation spanned.
The trial court failed to allow for any increases in hourly billing rates over the 4-5
years since this case began. The trial court directed the parties to submit affidavits of
other attorneys to establish the billing rates for attorneys with 4-9 years of practice;

15

The trial court's ruling stated that it could only document 6.8 hours of actual incourt time. Therefore, it allowed $175 per hour for those 6.8 hours and applied $125 per
hour for all other time.
16

The trial court applied $125 per hour for 83.8 hours instead of $175 per hour
and greater for subsequent years of practice. The difference of $50 per hour times 83.8
hours equals $4,190. Applying a greater rate for other years would result in an even
greater difference.
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"One factor to be considered is whether the billing rate is consistent with
the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services. The
Court directs the parties to submit, on or before April 15, 2005, 2005,
affidavits from other attorneys that establish the billing rates for
attorneys with four years of practice to nine years of practice in the areas
of breach of contract and collection matters.
Minute Entry (R. 793); Addendum 6 {emphasis added)
The trial court clearly contemplated that hourly rates vary depending on the number
of years of practice in the legal profession. Unlike the two affidavits submitted by
Appellees, the three affidavits submitted by Appellants provided billing rates for the
entire range of years requested by the trial court. But the trial court ignored those
affidavits. Instead, the trial court relied exclusively on the two affidavits from solo
practitioners who expressed no opinion on the range of 4-9 years of practice.
Notwithstanding the trial court's request for a range of billing rates covering the
range of years this case has spanned, the trial court failed to consider any increase in the
billing rate for Mr. Jensen from 2000 to 2005, representing years 5 through 10.
Mr. Jensen's billing rate began at $175 per hour in 2000 and increased to $200 per hour.
His billing rate since the Spring of 2005 has been and currently is $210 per hour.
However, the trial court allowed a beginning rate of $125 per hour and held that rate
constant through all years of this case. But there are no facts or evidence to support the
trial court's hourly rate beyond the years of experience expressed by the two solo
practitioners.
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Had the trial court accepted the three affidavits from partners of large law firms in
Salt Lake City, Mr. Jensen's billing rates would appear more than reasonable. The hourly
rates for associates in the law firm of Parsons Behle & Latimer range from $170 to $210
for 4-9 years of legal practice. (R. 801); Addendum 7 at 4. The rates in the law firm of
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. range from $190 and $240 for 4-8 years of legal practice.
(R. 802); Addendum 7 at 5. The hourly rates in the law firm of Kirton & McConkie
parallel those of Mr. Jensen. (R. 808); Addendum 7 at 1L By any objective standard,
Mr. Jensen's billing rates are neither excessive nor extreme when compared with the rates
of these three large law firms who represent scores of attorneys with similar experience as
Mr. Jensen. And, Mr. Jensen's billing rate is consistent with Mr. Hartill's billing rate for
"court preparation and appearances." (R. 824); Addendum 8 at 3.
Further, there is no basis for applying the lowest billing rate in an award of fees. The
question is whether or not the fees are reasonable. Some attorneys may charge less and
some may charge more. Their individual billing rates may be a function of their
expertise, their competence, and their success. If some attorneys charge $150 per hour
and others $200 per hour for similar services, is $175 per hour unreasonable? Or, at what
point are billing rates deemed unreasonable? How close to a range of fees charged by
other attorneys must the billing rate be to be considered reasonable? Must it be the
average? Must it be the minium of the range? Or, can it be at the upper end of the range
of fees and still be reasonable? The trial court appears to have adopted a minimalist's
approach by awarding the minimal billing rate of two solo practitioners.
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The trial court clearly applied an incorrect legal standard by including "overhead
expenses" as a factor in determining "similar services," which in turn caused it to
disallow affidavits from large law firms on the grounds that such firms have greater
overhead expenses than Mr. Jensen. The trial court also applied the incorrect billing rate
from Mr. Hartill, on which the trial court relied, by not clearly understanding the fee
agreement used by Mr. Hartill, since Mr. Hartill would have charged $175 per hour for all
work in this particular case. Further, the trial court failed to allow any increase in billing
rates over the nearly five-year period that these proceedings have spanned.

ISSUE NO. 2:
Whether the trial court's determination of the amount of billable time
allowed to Appellant's attorney was appropriate and reasonable.
After setting the hourly billing rate for Mr. Jensen, the trial court proceeded next to
opine on the amount of time to allow for the various legal tasks set forth in a Summary &
Outline of Fees Incurred During the Trial Phase. (R. 811); Addendum 4.17
The instant case is similar to the analysis of attorney fees in Salmon v. Davis County,
916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). In Salmon, "the fee award decision was made by a district
court judge who had before him only a written record and oral argument." Id. at 893.
17

It is noteworthy that the trial court rejected all three affidavits submitted by
Appellants but relied on Exhibit A of the affidavit from Mr. Orton of Kirton &
McConkie, Exhibit A, also included herein as Addendum 4, was prepared by Mr. Jensen
but it is not included anywhere in the Record except as part of Mr. Orton's affidavit.
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The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that it had "before it everything relied upon by
the court below. Accordingly, there is no justification for any deference to the trial court
because it was not advantaged in any way in the fact-finding process." Id.
Here, the litigation prior to Blevins I was resolved without a trial and without any
evidentiary hearings. On remand, more than two and one-half years later, the trial court
relied solely on the record, the Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During the Trial
Phase prepared by Appellants' attorney for the convenience of the trial court, the
additional affidavits of attorney fees on appeal and on remand, and the affidavits from
other attorneys on the issue of billing rates. There were no evidentiary hearings. And
importantly, the trial court expressly found that there "are no facts to this case" and
directed the parties to submit memoranda. See Minutes of Scheduling Conference,
dated November 19, 2004. (R. 695).
Based on the unique circumstances present in this appeal, "Blevins II" this Court has
before it everything relied upon by the trial court. Accordingly, there is no justification
for any deference to the trial court because it was not advantaged in any way in its
determination of reasonable attorney fees. Appellants, therefore, urge this Court not to
extend any deference to the trial court.
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II. The trial court erred in its determination of the amount of time allowed for the
legal work by failing to (a) make any detailed findings as required by this Court;
(b) consider Mr. Orton's affidavit in support of the amount of time billed: and
(c) examine the complete and pertinent part of the record.
The trial court allowed only about 60% of the time billed during these proceedings.
The trial court disallowed 32 hours of the 76.10 hours sought by Appellants for the trial
phase.18 (R. 844). Thus, the trial court allowed 58% of the time billed by Mr. Jensen.19
For appellate work, the trial court allowed 32 hours out of 51 hours billed, or 62%.
(R. 845). On remand for post-appellate work, the trial allowed 14.5 hours out of 24.60
hours billed, or 59%. (R. 846). Over all, the trial court allowed only 90.60 hours out of
151.70 hours billed, or about 60%.
In setting the amount allowed, the trial court, for the most part, simply opined on the
amount of time that a particular block of work should have taken. With only one
exception,20 the trial court did not find that any work was unnecessary. The one
exception relates to the time Mr. Jensen spent with the attorneys from the three large law

18

The trial court states that the trial and post-trial time billed was 76.10 hours.
(R. 844). That number is nowhere to be found in the Record. If one adds the 64.9 hours
from the trial phase and the 11 hours sought for post-trial collections, a total amount of
75.9 hours is obtained. Where the trial court found 76.10 hours is unknown. Since it is a
minor discrepancy, it is being ignored for the purposes of this appeal.
19

This percentage is derived by dividing 44.10 hours (the amount not disallowed
by the trial court) by 76.10 hours, which equals 58%.
20

The trial court did make minor mention about an unrelated task concerning a
guardianship that was mistakenly billed in the amount of 0.3 hours. That amount was
appropriately deducted.
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firms, which the trial court disallowed because "these [communications] have no value to
the case and therefore are not reasonable." (R. 846) Addendum 3 at 6. However, as
argued above on Issue No. 1, Appellants believe that the trial court erred by not
considering the affidavits from the three large law firms. If those affidavits had been
accepted by the trial court as Appellants contend, the time Mr. Jensen spent with those
three attorneys should have been deemed reasonable.
A. The trial court made nofindingsof fact as instructed in Blevins 7.
In Blevins 7, this Court expressly directed the trial court to enter "findings of fact"
consistent with this Court's Memorandum Decision. (R. 673); Addendum 2 at 3.
However, the trial court's Order and Judgment is void of any findings of fact.
(R. 841-47); Addendum 3. Instead, the trial court repeatedly used the term "determines."
In the process of doing so, the trial court merely leaps to its many determinations about
the amount of time various tasks should have taken with little instructive analysis. And
unfortunately, the trial court ignored outside evidence to the contrary when it disallowed
affidavits from three large law firms. Further, as cited above, the trial court expressly
found that there "are no facts to this case." See Minutes of Scheduling Conference
(R. 695).
But the trial court's opinions or determinations lack sufficient details to enable this
Court to review the trial court's analysis.
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In Salmon, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
The findings here appear to me to state little more than the trial court's
ultimate legal conclusion. In contrast, this court has always demanded
findings sufficiently detailed to "'disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached/" Butler, Crockett & Walsh
Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co,, 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah
1995) {quoting Acton v. IB. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). We
demand detailed findings because the reasonableness of an attorney fee
award is a highly fact-sensitive legal determination and '"detailed findings
are necessary to enable this court to meaningfully review the issues on
appeal.'" State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v.
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); see Cottonwood Mall,
830 P.2d at 269 ("Although a trial court has discretion to determine an award
of attorney fees, the exercise of that discretion must be based on an
evaluation of the evidence."); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
1985) ("An award of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis of
findings of fact supported by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of
law.").
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 at 901 (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court made no findings of fact. But even if the trial court's
"determinations" are deemed equivalent to findings of fact, they offer this Court very
little in the way of substantive analysis. Those determinations certainly don't provide
detailed steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion. Unless, however,
merely stating the number of pages contained in a pleading is sufficient to establish the
reasonable amount of time necessary to prepare such pleadings.
Moreover, the trial court did not identify any particular tasks that were unnecessary.
Rather, the trial court simply stated its opinion of the amount of time a particular motion and
memorandum should have taken.
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More troublesome, the trial court ignored the affidavit of Mr. Orton, a partner of
Kirton & McConkie. (R. 842); Addendum 3 at 2. Mr. Orton is a reputable and experienced
attorney with more than 20 years of experience and who has for nearly 10 years been a
member of the Executive Committee of the Litigation Section of the Utah State Bar.
Orton Aff. at 2-3; (R. 805-06); Addendum 7 at 8-9. He spent 2.25 hours reviewing all of the
pleadings in these proceedings, including those pleadings filed by opposing counsel or by
the opposing parties. Orton Aff. at 6; (R. 809); Addendum 7 at 12.
After Mr. Orion's extensive review of the pleadings, he opined as follows:
In looking at the overall amount charged, I considered of particular
significance (1) the hourly rate charged for the service; (2) the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the issues
involved and the result obtained; (4) the time constraints and number of
motions involved in the circumstances of the case; (5) the experience,
reputation and ability of Mr. Jensen, and (6) the fact that the fee
arrangement is hourly.
Upon consideration and reflection of the overall fee charged for the
services described in Exhibit "A" and "B" hereto, in light of my own
skill, knowledge, experience and training, and keeping in mind the
requirements of Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5, it is my
opinion that (a) the hourly rates charged by Mr. Jensen are within the
range of reasonableness for the services provided within the jurisdiction
of the Greater Salt Lake City area, and (b\ in particular, that the overall
fees charged by Mr. Jensen, as set forth on Exhibits "A" and "B" are
within the range of reasonableness for the services provided within the
jurisdiction of the Greater Salt Lake City area.
Orton Aff at 6-7; (R. 809-10); Addendum 7 at 12-13 (emphasis added).
No other evidence was submitted to or used by the trial court in determining the
amount of time to allow for Mr. Jensen's legal work.
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The Salmon case is particularly on point with the issues in the instant case.
Salmon submitted evidence establishing that in light of the various
reasonability factors, he was entitled to the full amount of attorney fees
he requested. Both Havas and Snow testified by affidavit that they had
reviewed Dunning's affidavit, the legal invoices, and the memorandum
in support of Salmon's motion for summary judgment, which included a
detailed description of the work done in the circuit court. Both witnesses
opined that their review of the specific facts and circumstances of
Salmons case indicated that the amounts charged and requested were
reasonable and necessary. Both attorneys testified that they were
familiar with rates customarily charged in this area and then went on to
address why specific tasks performed by Salmon's counsel were
necessary and reasonable in this case. In sum, I would conclude that
Salmon submitted evidence sufficient to support an award of attorney
fees in the amount he requested.
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 at 893 (emphasis added).
Mr. Orton provided his professional opinion on the reasonableness of the work
performed and the billing rates. He then rendered his opinion that the amount of fees
charged by Mr. Jensen were reasonable. Orton Aff. at 7; (R. 810); Addendum 7 at 13.
There was no controverting evidence submitted to the trial court. Similarly in Salmon,
the court stated:
"The County, in turn, failed to offer any evidence to rebut Salmon's
showing and thereby support an award for less than the amount Salmon
requested. Although the County argued below that certain fees should be
rejected or reduced, the County failed to submit any evidence to support
these arguments."
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 at 893.
As in Salmon, Appellees here failed to offer any evidence to rebut Mr. Orton's
affidavit. Had the trial court accepted Mr. Orton's affidavit, it would have been
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compelled to weigh that evidence in determining the amount of time to allow for the
various legal tasks.
B. Trial phase.
The trial court first stepped its way through the various blocks of tasks listed in the
table entitled Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During the Trial Phase, (R. 811);
Addendum 4. For the trial phase, the trial court selected five blocks of work and opined
an amount of time each block should have taken compared with the amount of time
actually billed. The trial court's opinions are set forth in its Order and Judgment as
subparagraphs "a" through "e" under the heading of "Trial and Post Trial."21 (R. 843-44);
Addendum 3 at 3-4.
(1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on First Cause of Action.
The trial court stated the following:
"a. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Cause of
Action. This Memorandum was five pages long, three and one-half of
which were facts and contained no legal citations. Mr. Jensen claimed
5.8 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is a reasonable
amount of time for this work."
Order and Judgment at 3; (R. 843); Addendum 3 at 3.
The trial court appears to "determine" the amount of time based on the number of
pages contained in a memorandum and discounts entirely the amount of time required to

21

Although the trial court used the term "post trial," it failed to provide any
analysis or opinion on the tasks involved in the post-trial collection phase.
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collect facts, all of which facts were external to the subject litigation. But the statement
by the trial court that the memorandum on the first cause of action "was five pages long,
three and one-half of which were facts and contained no legal citations" does not lead to a
conclusion that a reasonable amount of time for such memorandum is 1.5 hours instead of
the 5.8 hours claimed by Mr. Jensen. The trial court completely omits in its analysis the
justification provided by Appellants:
"... the legal work included a review of litigation in a previous
bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this case allegedly
had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that
allegation, it was necessary to obtain the affidavit of another attorney,
Richard Perkins, including various supporting documents from the
bankruptcy case. This led to the dismissal of the first cause of action.
This particular task required extensive research of documents in the
prior bankruptcy case and interviews of attorney Perkins. Although the
first cause of action was a frivolous claim, it nonetheless required a
substantial amount of time to defeat Plaintiffs' claim."
Mem. onAttyFees at 9-10; (R. 713-14).
For the trial court to merely weigh the number of pages and disallow the amount of
time necessary to research and collect such facts is insufficient for this Court to review
the trial court's analysis. The approach taken by the trial court, according to its own
words, should further compel this Court to grant no deference or discretion to the trial
court since the trial court appears only to have formed an opinion based on the length and
content of the subject memorandum in support of the motion for partial summary
judgment and since the trial court ignored entirely Mr. Orton's affidavit.
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To compound the trial court's lack of detailed steps, the trial court overlooked the full
content of the memorandum on the first cause of action. The "five pages" cited by the
trial court fails to recognize the affidavit and many exhibits in support of and attached to
the memorandum. (R. 57-83). The complete memorandum filed by Appellants contains
27 pages, including exhibits and the three-page affidavit of Richard Perkins, which was
also prepared by Mr. Jensen. (R. 57-83). The exhibits attached thereto include letters in
the bankruptcy proceeding and a canceled check paid in the bankruptcy proceeding.
(R. 80-83). The work involved multiple telephonic conversations with Mr. Perkins,
preparation of his affidavit, revisions of such affidavit at his request, and a meeting with
him to review and sign his affidavit. See Billing Records 11/16/2000 through 2/06/2001;
(R. 737-38). Also included from previous litigation were excerpts from a deposition of
Steven Blevins, one of the Plaintiffs and Appellees herein. This Court should find that
the amount of time billed by Mr. Jensen, being a mere 5.8 hours, is more than reasonable
for the amount of work necessary to produce the memorandum.
(2) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Cause of Action.
The trial court stated the following:
"b. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of
Action. This Memorandum was five and a half pages long, three of
which were facts and contained one legal citation. Mr. Jensen claimed
4.5 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is a reasonable
amount of time for this work."
Order and Judgment at 3; (R. 843); Addendum 3 at 3.
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Again, the trial court offers little analysis. The trial court also distorts the amount of
effort involved. The total number of pages relating to the memorandum on the second
cause action, if that is important, is actually 32 pages, not "five and a half pages."
(R. 220-51). The trial court appears to discount entirely the amount of effort required to
assemble "facts," For this particular memorandum, an analysis was required of
Mr. Blevins' deposition and his responses to interrogatories. Attachments to the
memorandum include excerpts from discovery, including a deposition and interrogatories.
(R. 234-43). A reply memorandum was also prepared and filed.
The trial court ignored entirely the supporting affidavits, deposition, and reply
memorandum in its analysis. Accordingly, the trial court failed to (1) evaluate all of the
pertinent record; and (2) to accept affidavit testimony from Mr. Orton on the
reasonableness of the fees billed by Mr. Jensen.
(3) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth
Causes of Action.
The trial court stated the following:
"c. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth
Causes of Action. This Memorandum was 9 pages long, two and a half
of which were facts. This memo did contain legal citations, the majority
of which were the usual citations used to set forth the standards for
granting summary judgment. For this memo he billed 13.5 hours. The
Court determines 4 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work."
Order and Judgment at 4; (R. 844); Addendum 3 at 4.
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Continuing in a similar pattern, the trial court offers no guidance to support its
opinion. The trial court also ignores the work required to research the factual issues from
discovery results, which included, as Exhibit C to the memorandum, extensive citations to
the deposition of Mr. Blevins. (R. 316-21). The trial court also ignored the work required
for a reply memorandum. (R. 410-16). Since the trial court only refers to the number of
pages in the memorandum, the quantity of facts, and whether there were legal citations or
not, this Court is not disadvantaged in any way in reviewing the same pleadings the trial
court reviewed in forming its opinion about the amount of time that should be allowed for
such work. Again, the trial court fails to cite any work that was unnecessary.
(4) Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs9 Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The trial court stated the following:
"d. A Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment. While this twelve page memo was more substantial then
(sic) his previous filings, it addressed two very simple issues. For this
memo he claimed 16 hours of billable time. The Court determines that 6
hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work."
Order and Judgment at 4; (R. 844); Addendum 3 at 4.
The trial court completely ignored the affidavits from Appellants, (R. 342-50), in
support of this memorandum and the citations to two depositions of Appellants,
(R. 352-55). The trial court also ignored the extensive motions and memoranda relating
to striking the hearsay portions of Mr. Blevins' affidavit. (R. 322-27, 401-05), not
including a motion to strike an improvidently filed Notice to Submit by Mr. Blevins.
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(R. 369-72). In effect, the work reasonably necessary to defeat Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment was extensive and far greater than characterized by the trial court.
Again, the trial court had no advantage over this Court in determining the reasonableness
of the amount of time required for this particular block of legal work. And the trial court
failed to identify any unnecessary legal work.
(5) Affidavits for Attorney Fees.
The trial court stated the following:
"e. Between April 10, 2001, and May 7, 2001, Mr. Jensen billed for five
Affidavits of Attorney's Fees. These affidavits are six paragraphs long,
five of which are identical. The one different paragraph outlines the
hours he is claiming, for this he billed 6.4 hours. The Court determines
1.5 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work."
Order and Judgment at 4; (R. 844); Addendum 3 at 4.
Although the trial court incorrectly counts the number of affidavits,22 the trial court's
opinion allows only 18 minutes for each of the affidavits for attorney fees submitted by
Mr. Jensen (1.5 hours divided by 5). To illustrate how unrealistic 18 minutes is,
Mr, Jensen would be expected to first review his billing records and determine the
amount of time billed for the additional work not previously billed and then incorporate
that amount of time in an affidavit, have it signed in the presence of a notary, and file and
serve the affidavit. On its face, that simply is not reasonable. An attorney must be
22

The Record does not support the trial court's count. There were three affidavits.
Perhaps, the trial court may have confused motions and memoranda relating to attorney
fees.
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diligent and cautious before submitting an affidavit of attorney fees. Meticulous care
must be taken to review the billing records for accuracy. It is unreasonable for an
attorney to be cavalier about the amount of time asserted in an affidavit. The trial court
seems to consistently disregard the amount of time to assemble complete and accurate
facts, including the amount of time to support an affidavit of attorney fees.
More importantly, however, the trial court referenced the wrong billing records.
Blevins I relates to Judgment I. Judgment I was entered on February 1, 2002 (R. 484-86);
Addendum 1. The billing records examined by the trial court ("from April 1, 2001 to
May 7,2001") were filed 9-10 months prior to Judgment I and were not in any way
calculated into the attorney fees sought for Judgment I. Rather, the trial court referenced
affidavits that were for an initial judgment in these proceedings in which the trial court
dismissed Custom Steel, et al. (R. 173-74). Following their dismissal, the trial court
awarded attorney fees to them in the amount of $1,330, the exact amount requested at that
time by Mr. Jensen. (R. 192-95, 204, 208). Therefore, the trial court examined on remand
billing records that are not related to Blevins I and which were not at issue on remand.
The proper part of the record that the trial court should have examined begins on
December 7, 2001 (R. 441) and continues through April 12, 2002 (R. 530-36), during
which period three affidavits were filed, the last one being in support of fees relating to
the collection of Judgment I.
There was substantial opposition to the amount of attorney fees sought for
Judgment I, and this created some mini-litigation over fees. See e.g., (R. 441-480). The
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total amount billed for preparation of affidavits of fees and memoranda in support of fees
and in opposition to Plaintiffs' memorandum was 7.8 hours. Summary & Outline of Fees
Incurred During the Trial Phase. (R. 811); Addendum 4. Unfortunately, the trial court
failed to examine the relevant part of the record.
C. Appellate Phase.
The trial court opined on the amount of time for three categories of pleadings filed
during the appellate phase. Order and Judgment at 5; (R. 845); Addendum 3 at 5. First,
the trial court allowed 1.5 hours for the first Docketing Statement and 0.5 hours for the
second Docketing Statement. Id. The amount of time billed and claimed is 3.4 hours and
2.2 hours respectively for the first and second Docketing Statements. The trial court
states that "all but three paragraphs are the standard statements to be contained in all
docketing statements." Id. The trial court apparently believes that all attorneys have a
template, kept up to date with the latest rules governing docketing statements, and that all
that is needed is dropping in a few "facts," "issues for review," and the "determinative
law."
However, there is no evidence that such docketing statements are routine documents
subject to boilerplate treatment. They certainly are not. And, the two subject docketing
statements were filed 8 months apart. Even if an attorney does some appellate work, that
attorney must rigorously follow the latest rules governing the form and content of
docketing statements. It is mandatory to update the research on relevant determinative
law cases. And, here again the trial court fails to appreciate the amount of time necessary
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to succinctly present a ''statement of facts" required in a docketing statement. The trial
court appears to be out of touch when it comes to the preparation of such documents!
Also, the trial court failed to acknowledge Mr. Orton's affidavit that supports the amount
of time billed on appeal.
The trial court seems to have placed itself in the role of an expert on how much time
appellate work should take as though the trial court has had recent experience in
preparing such documents. But that is not the case. The most recent case where the trial
court was counsel on an appeal was while part of a team of attorneys from the Attorney
General's office for a defendant where no docketing statement was required. That was
prior to 1994.23
Rule 9, Utah R. App. P., was amended in 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2005.
The Rule was completely rewritten in 2002. For the trial court to contend that
Appellants' docketing statement merely contained "standard statements to be contained in
all docketing statements," (R. 845); Addendum 3 at 5, demonstrates the trial court's lack
of familiarity with how often changes are made to the requirements for docketing
statements. The trial court's understanding of how much effort is required to properly
prepare a docketing statement appears lacking and unsupported by any evidence in the
record.

A Lexis-Nexis search of Utah judicial decisions reveals this information.
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For the third category, the trial court simply opines that the Brief should have taken
only 17 hours to prepare, edit and revise. Id. The amount claimed is 51 hours. The only
evidence on the reasonableness of time and fees was Mr. Orton's affidavit, which the trial
court ignored.
The trial court's appellate analysis also failed to consider (a) a motion to consolidate
the two appeals; (b) motions and cross-motions for summary disposition; and (c) a
Petition for Rehearing.24
As in Salmon, this Court is not disadvantaged in any way to review the number of
hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the appeal work. The specific affidavit and billing
records in support of the appellate work are included in the Record. (R. 697-704). The
specific tasks performed are listed in the affidavit as follows:
a. File two appeals;
b. Prepare two Docketing Statements;
c. File a Motion to Consolidate both appeals;
d. File Motion for Summary Disposition;
e. Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Appeal;
f. Prepare and file Brief;
g. Prepare Reply Brief based on fallacious statements in Plaintiffs' Brief;
h. Prepare and file Petition for Rehearing;
i. Conduct research on all issues for Docketing Statements, Briefs, and
Petition for Rehearing.
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal at 2; (R. 698).

24

Since this Court failed to include in its first Memorandum Decision a provision
for attorney fees on appeal, a Petition for Rehearing was required. This Court then issued
an Amended Memorandum Decision. Addendum 2.
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This Court is in an equal position with the trial court to evaluate whether the 51 hours
of time billed for the above work is reasonable. More importantly, the affidavit of
Mr. Orton completely supports the amount of time billed by Mr. Jensen. Mr. Orton's
affidavit should also be considered. There is no controverting evidence in the Record.
D. Post Appellate Phase.
The trial court considered four categories of work during the post-appellate phase of
these proceedings.
(1) Affidavit for Attorney Fees.
The trial court stated the following:
"a. Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. Once again this affidavit is substantially the
same as the previous five affidavits. Mr. Jensen billed 1.5 hours. A reasonable
amount is 0.5 hours."
Order and Judgment at 5; (R. 845); Addendum 3 at 5.
First, the trial court refers to the "previous five affidavits." We now know that the
trial court was incorrect in identifying such affidavits, since those affidavits were never
part of Blevins /nor in support of Judgment I,
Second, the trial court fails to consider Mr. Orton's affidavit in support of such fees
and no controverting evidence is found in the Record. And, the trial court fails to allow
any time for preparing the billing records and describing the tasks required during
remand.
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(2) Memorandum on Attorney Fees and Costs.
The trial court stated the following:
"b. Memorandum on Attorney's Fees. This memorandum is billed at 7.9 hours.
This contains much information previously submitted. A reasonable amount is 5
hours."
Order and Judgment at 5-6; (R. 845-46); Addendum 3 at 5-6.
The memorandum on fees filed on remand is 15 pages plus 60 pages of exhibits, and
plus a reply memorandum. (R. 705-75); Addendum 10. The memorandum had to be
tailored to fit the needs of the post-appellate phase, including a discussion on billable
costs incurred on appeal as provided by Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P. This additional
discussion became necessary when both the trial court and its clerk ignored Rule 34(d).25
See Memo, on Atty Fees and Costs at 6-7; (R. 710-711); Addendum 10 at 6-7. Although
the costs incurred on appeal were eventually included in Judgment III, they should have
rightly been included in a separate judgment in accordance with Rule 34(d). The failure
of the trial court to abide by the requirements of Rule 34(d) required Appellants to file a
Request for Order and to include a lengthy discussion of Rule 34(d) in their
Memorandum of Attorney fees and Costs. Id.

25

Apparently the policy of the trial court is not to follow Rule 34(d), Rather, the
clerk of the court will only enter a judgment for billable costs upon an order from the trial
court. In this case, however, even after a Request for Order (R. 689-90) was filed, the
trial court declined to enter an order requiring the clerk to follow Rule 34(d).
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(3) Outline and Summary of Fees and Affidavits from other Attorneys.
The trial court stated the following:
"c. Outline and summary of fees incurred during trial and analysis of affidavits
from attorneys. The court requested specific information from attorneys of
similar work experience and situation. The affidavits submitted by Mr. Jensen in
no way answered this request. Since there is no breakdown of these 3.4 hours
between the outline of fees, which has been seen before, and the work on the
affidavits, the total of 3.4 hours is disallowed."
Order and Judgment at 6; (R. 846); Addendum 3 at 6. {emphasis added).
First, the trial court's insertion of the words "and situation" was not included in
its request to the parties, which reads:
"One factor to be considered is whether the billing rate is consistent with
the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services. The
Court directs the parties to submit, on or before April 15, 2005, 2005,
affidavits from other attorneys that establish the billing rates for
attorneys with four years of practice to nine years of practice in the areas
of breach of contract and collection matters.
Minute Entry (R. 793); Addendum 6 {emphasis added).
The trial court again appears to confuse "similar services" with "similar situations."
Second, the trial court's statement that the "affidavits submitted by Mr. Jensen in no
way answered this request" is clearly erroneous. The affidavits submitted by Appellees
contained only the billing rates of two solo practitioners. (R. 822-27); Addendum 8.
Those affidavits did not contain billing rates for a range of "four years of practice to nine
years of practice" as requested by the trial court. On the other hand, the affidavits
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submitted by Mr. Jensen were clearly on point by providing billing rates for scores of
attorneys with 4-9 years of practice. (R. 798-812); Addendum 7. Based on the clear error
of the trial court, the amount of time disallowed was improper.
(4) Miscellaneous communications and meetings.
The trial court stated the following:
"d. Phone calls, e-mails and meetings with Mr, Orton and Mr. West[on], These
were billed at 3.3 hours. For the reason stated above, these have no value to the
case and therefore are not reasonable. The total 3.3 hours is disallowed."
Order and Judgment at 6; (R. 846); Addendum 3 at 6.

Again, the trial court improperly ignored the affidavits submitted by the three large
law firms. If those affidavits are deemed appropriate, the time spent of 3.3 hours should
be allowed.
In sum, the trial court allowed only 90.6 hours out of 151.5 hours billed. And it
reached this conclusion without considering Mr. Orton's affidavit and without
considering any other evidence in the Record. The trial court did not enjoy any advantage
over what this Court has before it—the Record.
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III. Summary of Fees Billed and Disallowed,
To assist this Court, a summary table of fees that were allowed and claimed is set
forth below:
Description of Fees

Hours
Billed

Hours
Allowed

Amount
Sought

Amount
Allowed26

Trial Proceedings

64.9

33.1

$11,538

$4,37827

Post-Trial Collection Proceedings

11.0

11.0

$2,107

$1,375

Appeal Proceedings: Blevins I

51.0

32.0

$10,200

$4,000

Post Appeal on Remand

24.6

14.5

$4,920

$1,91228 |

151.5

90.6

$28,765

TOTALS =

$11,665

From the Summary Table above, the trial court allowed only $11,667 in fees
compared with $28,765 billed and sought, or only 40.6% of the total requested. It is also
noteworthy that the trial court first found Mr. Jensen's attorney fees to be reasonable in its
Judgment I and allowed $6,050, (R. 484-86); Addendum 1, for attorney fees but on
remand allows only $4,378. See Summary Table above. Such a reduction further

26

Generally, the trial court applied a billing rate of $125 per hour but allowed 6.8
hours at $175 per hour. The 6.8 hours was prorated between the "Trial Proceedings"
(4.8 hours) and the "Post Appeal on Remand (2.0 hours).
27

Calculated as follows: 4.8 hrs x $175 + 28.3 hrs x $125 = $4,377.50.

28

The amount on remand is an estimate based on 2 hours of in-court time at $175
per hour and the balance of 12.5 hours at $125 per hour. The trial court did not provide a
breakout by category of fees for its estimate of court time and non-court time.
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supports Appellants belief that the trial court may have retaliated against Appellants and
possibly Mr. Jensen for appealing and obtaining a reversal of its Judgment I.
Appellants request this Court to reverse the trial court and to remand with
instructions to modify Judgment III to include the full amount sought by Appellants plus
the attorney fees incurred on this appeal at Mr. Jensen's current billing rate of $210 per
hour. Merely instructing the trial court to consider the affidavits from the three large law
firms, including in particular Mr. Orion's affidavit, and to recompute all of the attorney
fees on remand would only subject the parties and the trial court to an undue burden that
would further add to the amount of attorney fees.
At some point, the issue of attorney fees should end. As the Utah Supreme Court
stated in Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992), it is not the intent".
.. to turn fee award determinations into satellite litigation ..." If this Court simply
remands for findings consistent with another memorandum decision, the trial court will be
frustrated, the parties will be frustrated, and more importantly, the amount of attorney
fees will increase beyond what they are now.

CONCLUSION
On Issue No. 1, the trial court ignored the affidavits from large law firms on the basis
that those firms have higher overhead expenses than a solo practitioner like Mr. Jensen.
The trial court also failed to correctly apprehend the distinction between "court work" and
"non-court work" as those terms were used by the affiant (Mr. Hartill) upon which the
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trial court relied in determining a reasonable billing rate. Finally, the trial court failed to
allow any increase in billing rates for Mr. Jensen over the five years spanned by these
proceedings.
On Issue No. 2, the trial court made no findings of fact. Rather, the trial court merely
stated, often incorrectly, the number of pages in the various memoranda and ignored the
many affidavits in support of those memoranda. The trial court also gave little or no
weight to the amount of time required to assemble facts and prepare supporting affidavits.
The affidavit of Mr. Orton was ignored, although such affidavit provides a professional
opinion on the reasonableness of Mr. Jensen's attorney fees. Instead, the trial court
substituted itself as an expert on the amount of time various tasks should have taken.
The trial court relied exclusively on the Record below and expressly stated that there
.

were "no facts" to be determined. (R. 695). Therefore, the trial court was not advantaged
in any way in its determination of attorney fees. This Court is not disadvantaged in
making its own findings and determinations concerning the amount of attorney fees to
award for all legal work considered by the trial court.
Appellants urge this Court to end the attorney fee litigation by reversing the trial
court and instructing the trial court to modify its judgment to include the full amount of
fees and costs sought. On remand, this Court should further instruct the trial court to
determine the amount of attorney fees incurred on appeal in a manner consistent with the
billing rates applied by this Court and consistent with the principles set forth by this
Court. Attorney fees on appeal are provided by the underlying contract that gave rise to
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an award of attorney fees in Blevins I, and Appellants request this Court to expressly
provide for such fees on appeal in its ruling.

POST SCRIPT
It may be unusual and somewhat unorthodox to add a "post script" to Appellants5
Brief. But the issue of attorney fees in this case gives rise to a general, and far too
frequently, contentious issue of how Utah's trial courts are awarding attorney fees. The
entire approach taken by the trial court in this case appears arbitrary and minimalistic,
Had the trial court initially awarded the fees sought by Appellants, particularly after the
trial court expressly found such fees to be "reasonable," this case would have concluded
with a fee award of $11,538 and no appeals. Instead, Appellants have incurred $28,765
in fees, not including the expense of the current appeal, Blevins II, which will likely
exceed Blevins I by $4-5,000 because of the greater complexity of the issues herein.
Appellants suggest to this Court that attorney fees should be awarded by trial courts
on the basis that such fees are, on their face, deemed reasonable and should only be
reduced if found to be extreme or unconscionable. After all, attorneys are officers of the
court and have a duty to charge reasonable fees.
In the instant case, the trial court did not identify tasks that were unnecessary to the
litigation. The trial court merely opined that a particular pleading should have been done
in less time than what was billed. Often the trial court overlooked companion pleadings
and supporting affidavits. Perhaps the trial court was in a hurry. Whatever the cause, the
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process has burdened the trial court and the parties way beyond reasonableness. And,
after Blevins 7, the trial court still got it wrong on remand.
Despite all attempts to keep fees reasonable, the courts in this case have also added
unnecessarily to the attorney fee expenses. The trial court's proprietary procedures to
award costs incurred on appeal required Appellants to file additional pleadings that are
not required by Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P. The example cited above concerning
Rule 34(d) is just one example. The trial court has informally adopted its own particular
procedure for an award of costs on appeal, and that procedure ignores the requirements of
Rule 34(d).
Another example is the way the trial court acted when Appellees attempted to force
Appellants to sign away their rights to an appeal by insisting that a Satisfaction of
Judgment be issued. When Appellants rejected a blanket satisfaction of judgment but
instead offered a limited satisfaction, Appellees, without notice, took the matter directly
to the trial court. Despite the provisions of Rule 58B, Utah R. Civ. P., the trial court,
without notice or hearing, entered its own satisfaction of judgment for Appellees.
(R. 854). Appellants were then compelled to request that the trial court rescind such
satisfaction of judgment. (R. 858-62). The trial court complied with the request but only
after additional pleadings were filed.
And finally, this Court has also contributed to the amount of attorney fees in Blevins I
by first failing to include a provision for attorney fees. Appellants were compelled to file
a Petition for Rehearing, and this Court then issued an amended memorandum decision
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with an award of attorney fees on appeal. All in all, attorney fees have been greater
because of the actions of the courts themselves.
What is needed is greater uniformity and predictability in awarding attorney fees.
Such predictability should lead to fewer appeals over issues of fees and should yield
greater confidence in fee-shifting provisions contained in contracts. As it is now, fees can
be from 10% to 100% of the amount requested with no certainty and no predictability
except for the propensity of certain trial courts.

DATED this 28th day of November 2005.

*-^t&Uj&
Michael A. Jensen (7^3
Counsel for Appellants
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STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN R1CI3TRY
DATS

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motions and Memoranda for Summary
Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action and also having reviewed
Plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition, and after hearing on November 30, 2001, at which
all parties were represented by counsel and where Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to
dismissing Plaintiffs' Second and Fourth Causes of Action, now makes the following
conclusions:

1. After applying the test as set forth in Ward v Intermountain Farmers Ass X
907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), the Court finds that Paragraph 3.2.b. of the Settlement
Agreement, which forms the subject matter for Plaintiffs' Third Cause Action, is
unambiguous.
2. The Settlement Agreement provides that Mr. Blevins use his best business
judgment in negotiating and settling the Clean Gas Receivable claim.and that Mr. Blcvin3
admittedly did or ghould have used his best business judgment in accepting the amount
from Clean Gas on the Clean Gas Receivable claim. As a consoquoncofmere was and is
no offset as contemplated within the Settlement Agreement to support Plaintiffs' claim.
•Further, there was and is no breach of Defendants' duty to act witli-good faith and fair
dealing.
3. Consistent with the Court's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action should be
granted.
4. Since the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorney fees to the
prevailing party, Defendants are determined to be the prevailing party and are therefore
entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
Siuua Mi. Dievins used his bcsl bubinc^ judgment when he accepted Llie dinuunt
paid by Clean Gas, the Court finds that there is no need to consider whether Mr. Blevins'

The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on
the First Cause of Action and now by granting summary judgment on all remaining
causes of action, and after reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by
Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action be granted and
that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed,in its entirety with prejudice and on ito mcrita.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants be awarded their reasonable
attornev fees in the amount of$[p OOP

DATED this

\K

day o

AGREED AS TO FORM:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Custom\Order3 Final Order Judgment December 7, 2001
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GREENWOOD, Judge:
Randy and Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and Wendy Garamendi
(collectively, Defendants) appeal from two orders of the trial
court. We reverse and remand.
Defendants make two arguments on appeal. First, Defendants
argue that the trial court's decision to reduce their attorney
fees, incurred as a result of defending a breach of contract
action, was unsupported by findings of fact. Second, Defendants
argue that the trial court's decision to deny them additional

1.
T h i s Amended Memorandum D e c i s i o n r e p l a c e s t h e Memorandum
D e c i s i o n i n Case N o . 20020177-CA i s s u e d o n J u n e 1 0 , 2 0 0 4 .

attorney fees, incurred in pursuing enforcement of their initial
award of attorney fees, was likewise unsupported by findings of
fact.
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). However,
"although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award must
be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact."
Anderson v. Poms, 1333 UT App 207,^9, 984 P.2d 392 (quotations
and citations omitted). Specifically, in determining an award of
reasonable attorney fees, trial courts are required to answer the
following four questions:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
2. How much of the work performed was
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute
the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent
with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). Indeed,
this court has made it clear that a trial court "'abuses its
discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees]
requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more of
the above factors." Endrody v. Endrodv, 914 P.2d 1166, 1171
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted);
see also Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (noting that trial court erred because it reduced, without
explanation, the prevailing party's attorney fees).
In this case, the trial court determined in its first order
that Defendants' initial request for attorney fees was
"reasonable." However, without providing any explanation or
making any findings of fact, the trial court then reduced the
fees sought by Defendants from $11,538 to $6050. Although
Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a local attorney stating
that Defendants' attorney fees should not exceed $7000, it is not
clear from the trial court's order that this was the reason for
the reduction in the amount of fees awarded. Similarly, the
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trial court's decision to deny Defendants' request for additional
attorney fees, incurred in enforcing the original judgment, was
unsupported by any findings of fact. In its second order, the
trial court noted only that the additional fees .requested were
"unreasonable."
Based on the foretgfaing," the trial court r's reduction in
Defendants' .initial, award of attorney fees and its subsequent
denial of Defendants' request for additional attorney fees
constituted' arf abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we remand for
the entry of findings of fact consistent with this decision, and
if appropriate, for an adjustment in the amount of attorney fees
awafdecT*t5o""Defendants by the trial court. Moreover, because the
fee-shifting provision of the settlement agreement entered into
by th*£"parties also^'allQws for the recovery of attorney fees
incurred on appeal, we award Defendants reasonable attorney fees
incurred as a result of this appeal in an amount to be determined
by the trial court on remand.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Juag

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Associate—Presiding Judge

James Z^/Davis,

20020177-CA
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This matter was reversed and remanded to this Court for findings of fact and, if appropriate,
for an adjustment in the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the defendants.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial court must answer four questions in
determining an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Those four questions are outlined in Dixie
State Bankv Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The Appellate Court continued that the trial
court must establish that any reduction is warranted by one or more of the four factors. Not all
four factors must be addressed.
A review of the factors applicable to this case is necessary:
1.

Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services?

The Court directed the parties to submit Affidavits of attorneys with similar experience,
both in terms of work and length of practice, with the billing rates of those individuals. Affidavits
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from the defendant's counsel were from large law firms with large offices. One Affidavit, from
Mr. Willis Orton, said associates from his firm charged similar rates, although he did not state
what the actual rate was.
A second Affidavit from defense counsel was from Kent Alderman, also from a large law
firm. He stated that his firm bills for the time of four year associates at $120 per hour and six
year associates at $185 per hour.
The third Affidavit was also from a large national law firm. Mr. John Weston stated his
firm's billing rates for attorneys with 4 to 8 years of experience is $190 to $240 per hour.
The plaintiff submitted two Affidavits from solo practitioners.1 The defendant's counsel is
also a sole practitioner. These Affidavits establish rates of $120 to $175. One Affiant pointed
out that his rate was $125 an hour for non-court appearances and $175 for court appearances.
There is no question that the billing rates contained in the affidavits submitted by Mr.
Jensen must be viewed in light of the organization of the offices which submitted them. Large
law firms, and especially national law firms, have large overhead/expenses. Mr. Jensen would
not have such expenses. As noted in his filings, he worked out of his home.
The Court determines that the rates charged by the solo practitioners are consistent with
the rates customarily charged for similar services and by attorneys in similar situations, and
therefore awards Mr. Jensen $125 an hour for non-court lime and $175 an hour for court time.
2.

How much of the work performed was routinely necessary to adequately

Mr. Jensen filed a response in opposition to one Affidavit. Mr. Blevins moved to strike because it
was based on hearsay. This request is well taken and the Affidavit of Mr. Jensen, dated 4/15/05 is
stricken.
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prosecute the matter?
This factor is difficult for a Court to answer, because it requires a detailed review of the
billing, along with a comparison to the work product supplied to the Court. When this is done,
the Court then must determine if the work was reasonable, both as to necessity and time to
complete.
As has been pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P 2d
305, 317 (1998), "[a] trial court's discretion in determining the amount of reasonable attorney fee
'arises from the fact that it is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality and
efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation." (citing, Richard Barton
Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996).
The Court will give several examples of the work billed by Mr Jensen, divided into trial
and post trial billings, appellate billings, and post appellate billings:
Trial and Post Trial
a. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Cause of Action. This
Memorandum was five pages long, three and one-half of which were facts and contained no
legal citations. Mr. Jensen claimed 5.8 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is
a reasonable amount of time for this work.
b. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action. This
Memorandum was five and a half pages long, three of which were facts and contained one legal
citation. Mr. Jensen claimed 4.5 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is a
reasonable amount of time for this work.
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c. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action.
This Memorandum was 9 pages long, two and a half of which were facts. This memo did
contain legal citations, the majority of which were the usual citations used to set forth the
standards for granting summary judgment. For this memo he billed 13.5 hours. The Court
determines that 4 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work.
d. A Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. While this
twelve page memo was more substantial then his previous filings, it addressed two very simple
issues. For this memo he claimed 16 hours of billable time. The Court determines that 6 hours
is a reasonable amount of time for this work.
e. Between April 10, 2001, and May 7, 2001, Mr. Jensen billed for five Affidavits for
Attorney's Fees. These affidavits are six paragraphs long, five of which are identical. The one
different paragraph outlines the hours he is claiming, for this he billed 6.4 hours. The Court
determines that 1.5 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work.
f. Contained in the billing submitted to the Court is .3 hour for guardianship work, which
does not appear to be related to this case. The Court disallows this claim.
The total amount of hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the trial and post trial fees was
76.10 hours. The Court has determined that 32 hours were not necessary and awards Mr.
Jensen 44.10 hours for the trial and post trial work.
Appellate Time
The Court has reviewed the claim for Appellate as directed by the Court of Appeals.
Because the Court has had experience in handling in appellate work a review of the claims is
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appropriate,
a. Mr. Jensen claims 3.4 hours to prepare the Docketing Statement. The Court has
reviewed the statement submitted by Mr. Jensen. AH but three paragraphs are the standard
statements to be contained in all docketing statements. The statement of facts, issues for
review and determinative law required some work. The Court determines that 1.4 hours is a
reasonable amount of time for the preparation of the statement.
b. Docketing Statement for 2nd Appeal was billed at 2.2 hours. A review of that
document shows that it is nearly identical to the first docketing statement. A reasonable time for
this work is .5 hours.
c. Preparation of the Brief. Mr. Jensen claims 32.5 hours for the preparation of the
brief, including 17.5 hours for editing and finalizing the brief. Mr. Jensen stated he had recent
experience in appellate briefing. The Court has reviewed the brief submitted by Mr. Jensen. A
reasonable amount of time for the brief and the revision is 17 hours.
The total amount of hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the appellate fees was 51.0 hours.
The Court has determined that 19.2 hours were not necessary and awards Mr. Jensen 32 hours
for the appellate work.
Post Appellate Time
a. Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. Once again this affidavit is substantially the same as the
previous five affidavits. Mr. Jensen billed 1.5 hours. A reasonable amount is .5 hours
b. Memorandum on Attorney's Fees. This memorandum is billed at 7.9 hours. This
contains much information previously submitted. A reasonable amount of time for this work is 5

rxx^

BLEVINS V. CUSTOM STEEL

PAGE 6

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

hours.
c. Outline and summary of fees incurred during trial and analysis of affidavits from
attorneys. This was billed at 3.4 hours. The Court requested specific information from
attorneys of similar work experience and situation. The affidavits submitted by Mr. Jensen in no
way answered this request. Since there is no breakdown of these 3.4 hours between the
outline of fees, which has been seen before, and the work on the affidavits, the total 3.4 hours is
disallowed.
d. Phone calls, e-mails and meetings with Mr. Orton and Mr. West. These were billed at
3.3 hours. For the reason stated above, these have no value to the case and therefore are not
reasonable. The total 3.3 hours is disallowed.
The total amount of hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the post- appellate fees was 24.60
hours. The Court has determined that 10.1 hours were not necessary and awards Mr. Jensen
14.5 hours for the post-appellate work.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the direction of the Court of Appeals, this Court has reviewed the request of
counsel for the defendants for attorney's fees for the trial, post-trial, appellate and postappellate work.
The Court has determined that the proper hourly rate for an attorney of Mr. Jensen's
experience and situation is $125.00 an hour for non-courtroom work and $175.00 for court-room
work. The total amount of hours determined to be reasonable is 90.60,
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Mr Jensen did not break out court room from non-court room hours. However, the
Court did determine from a review of the docket that it could document 6.80 hours of court time.
The amount of fees awarded are
83.8 hours of non-court time at $125.00 an hour

= $10,475 00

6.8 hours of court times at $175.00 an hour

=

1,190.00

Costs on Appeal

=

575.97

Total

= $12,240 97

Judgment is awarded to the defendants in the sum of $12,240.97 less the sum of
$6,050.00 previously paid by the plaintiffs.

Dated this Y_ day of July, 2005.

L A. DE^
DISTRICT COURT JUDC

Tab 4

Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During The Trial Phase
Prepared February 28, 2005

Item

Description

1

Review Complaint; prepare Answer; throughout
proceedings, prepare procedural pleadings for
scheduling, notices, conferences, and hearings;
throughout proceedings, client consultations

5.1

$907

2

Prepare motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment: Cause of Action ("CO A") 1

5.8

$1,031

3

Discovery activities, including Defendants'
requests for discovery and Plaintiffs' requests
for discovery

8.4

$1,493

4

Prepare motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment: CO A 2

4.5

$800

5

Oppose Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion or motion to
"Reinstate" claims

2.2

$391

13.5

$2,400

14.3

$2,542

3.3

$587

7.8

$1,387

64.9

$11,538

1
7

1
1

Hours

6 Prepare motion and memorandum in support of

Amount*

summary judgment: CO A 3 and COA 4
Oppose Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on COA 3, including affidavits and
motions to strike Plaintiffs hearsay testimony

8i Prepare for and attend hearing on summary

|

i judgment motions, including preparation and
delivery of courtesy copies the Court's clerk

9 Prepare affidavits of attorney fees; prepare

memoranda in support of fees and in opposition
to Plaintiffs' filed objections and affidavits
TOTALS

* The amount for each category was determined by multiplying the number of hours
times the blended hourly rate of $177.7812. The total amount of $11,538, is consistent
with the Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed December 26, 2001.

Exhibit A

Tab 5

SUMMARY TABLE OF FEES AND COSTS
February 28, 2005
Description of Fees

Exhibit

1
1

1
1

A

Trial Court Proceedings

B

Post-Trial Collection Proceedings

C
D

Appeal Costs
Appeal Proceedings
Estimate of1 Proceedings on Remand
TOTALS (except on Remand)

Amount
Sought

Amount
Paid

Amount
Unpaid

$11,538

$6,050

$5,488

$2,107

$0

$2,107

$575

$0

$575

$10,200

$0

$10,200

$0

$4,120

$6,050

$22,490

$4,120 !
$28,540

DATED this 28th day of February 2005.

L

iM

Michael A. Jens
Attorney for

1

The estimate for fees on remand include actual times spent plus 3.5 hours of
estimated time for attending the hearing set for March 7, 2005 and to prepare and submit
a final order and judgment, including findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Custom\Blevins3\Summary of Fees February 28, 2005
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

vs

Case No: 000906072

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION INC,
Defendant.

Judge: L A DEVER
Date: 03/28/2005

m «v"i"
Pursuant to the decision of the court of Appeals (Blevins v.
Isaacson, 2004 UT App 265} this Court must consider certain factors
when awarding attorney fees. One factor to be considered is
whether the billing rate is consistent with the rates customarily
charged in the locality for similar services. The Court directs
the parties to submit, on or before April 15, 2005, affidavits from
other attorneys that establish the billing rates for attorneys with
four years of practice to nine years of practice in the areas of
breach of contract and collection matters.
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

"' j * ^

i s

*

£Uiiu hi

Filed 04/13/2005

n

s,tLT L ;
BY

„L

; /J::TY
L A

,,» « » . —
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Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANTS'S AFFIDAVITS ON
ATTORNEY FEES FROM LOCAL
ATTORNEYS

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

In response to the Court's Minute Entry dated March 28,2005, Defendants, by and
through counsel, hereby submit three affidavits, attached hereto, on attorney fees from the
following attorneys, all of whom are partners in their respective law firms:
Kent B. Alderman, Parsons Behle & Latimer
John G. Weston, Snell & Wilmer
R. Willis Orton, Kirton& McConkie
DATED this 13th day of April 2005.
Michael A. Jensen CJ
Attorney for Defendants
Custom\Blevins3\Affidavits on Attorney Fees April 13, 2005

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,
Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for the Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing DEFEND ANTS'S AFFIDAVITS ON ATTORNEY
FEES FROM LOCAL ATTORNEYS by mailing a copy to:
Steven and Debra Blevins
10758 South 1090 East
Sandy, Utah 84094

DATED this 15th day of April 2005.

^jUM^
MICHAEL A. JENSEN, Esq.

Custom\Blevins3\Affidavits on Attorney Fees April 13, 2005
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN BLEVINS AND DEBRA KAY
BLEVINS,

AFFIDAVIT ON ATTORNEY BILLING
RATES (KENT B. ALDERMAN)

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 000906072
vs.

Judge L.A. Dever

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., et
al.,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The undersigned, Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer, upon his oath states as
follows:
1.

I am a member of the Utah State Bar, and I am licensed to practice law in the state

of Utah,
2.

My firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer, regularly provides legal services, including

contract litigation, to numerous businesses and individuals in Utah.
3.

Our firm customarily charges the following billing rates based on an attorney's

years of experience:

696604.1

Years of Experience

DATED this

Amount

4

$170

5

$180

6

$185

7

$190

8

$200

9

$210

S _day of April, 2005.

_

^

KENTIIA'LDIRMAN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

. ^c?4SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
, > _ day of April, 2005
LINDA R BAILEY
Notary Public

NOTARY PUBLIC

am south mn*\mSLC JT w ] ^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/7325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

AFFIDAVIT ON ATTORNEY
BILLING RATES
(John G. Weston)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 000906072

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Judge L.A. Dever

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

The undersigned, John G. Weston of Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., upon his oath states
as follows:
1.

I am a member of the Utah State Bar, and I am licensed to practice law in

the state of Utah.
2.

My firm, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., regularly provides legal services,

including litigation relating to breach of contract matters, to numerous businesses and
individuals in the state of Utah.
3.

I am a partner at Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

4.

The Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. Salt Lake City office customarily charges

hourly billing rates between $190.00 and $240.00 for attorneys with four to eight years of
experience practicing law.

344255 2

DATED this 8th day of April, 2005

J«(hn G. Weston
Snell & Wlfmer L.L.P.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to me before this 8th day of April, 2005.

NOTARY P^UBLIC '
NOTARY PUBLIC
CINDY MEEHAN
15 W So Temple Ste 1200
Sait Lake City, Utah 34101
My Commission Expires
july 20 2008

STA T E OF UTAH

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
801 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
Counsel for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF
R. WILLIS ORTON AS TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES

STEVEN C. BLEVINS and DEBRA
KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 000906072
vs.
:
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss:
)

-1-

Judge Leon E. Dever

I, R. Willis Orton, having been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am an attorney and have been a member of the Utah State Bar since

October 6, 1981, which admission has entitled me to practice law in the state of Utah and
to appear as counsel before all state trial and appellate courts as well as all state and most
federal administrative agencies. With the exception of a two week period in April 1984,
when I moved to Arizona, I have practiced continuously in Salt Lake City with the law
firms of Greene, Callister & Nebeker (nka Callister Nebeker & McCullough); Parsons,
Davies, Kinghorn & Peters; Mackay Price & Williams, and, for the last six and one-half
years, with Kirton & McConkie, P.C.
2.

I was also admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the

District of Utah in October 1981. I have since been admitted to practice before the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
and the United States Supreme Court.
3.

Since my admission to the Utah State Bar, my practice has been largely civil

litigation, with the largest component thereof being commercial litigation in nature,
encompassing both the prosecution and defense of lender liability, real estate,
racketeering, securities fraud, corporate governance and shareholder derivative, and
general commercial disputes.
-2-

4.

Since 1996,1 have served as a member of the Executive Committee of the

Litigation Section of the Utah State Bar and from July 2001 to July 2002, served as Chair
of the Litigation Section. I continue to serve on the Executive Committee of the
Litigation Section. In addition, I have served as a standing member of the Model Utah
Jury Instruction Committee ("MUJI"), primarily responsible for the section on business
torts and have been a member of two Inns of Court.
5.

I am completely familiar with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule

1.5, which governs the ethical requirements of reasonableness of attorney fees charged to
clients by lawyers, and the factors therein recited for consideration of the reasonableness
of attorney fees. I make use of Rule 1.5 on a continuous basis in my own practice, to
assure that the fees I charge are reasonable within the confines of the Rule.
6.

In the course of my legal career, I have kept up on the range of hourly rates

and other charges for lawyers with practices and experience in the Salt Lake City area
similar to my own. My knowledge in this area includes ranges for lawyers at large local
firms, mid-size local firms and small local firms who practice commercial litigation, as
well as the regional imports over the past two decades who have driven up the hourly
rates in the marketplace. Much of my knowledge is derived from word of mouth from
other lawyers, and a substantial amount of knowledge I hold concerning rates charged by
lawyers is derived from reviewing affidavits of attorneys fees, costs and expenses in many
scores of cases I have handled in my practice where such affidavits have been submitted.
-3-

In addition, for two years, I was a member of Kirton & McConkie's compensation
committee, which regularly monitors hourly rates for lawyers, including associates, in the
Greater Salt Lake City area, and have developed a general understanding of the hourly
rates charged by many solo and firm-associated lawyers in the area.
7.

From the foregoing base of knowledge, I have become aware in my practice,

and have maintained awareness over the course of my practice, of the fees customarily
charged in the Greater Salt Lake City area for services rendered to clients in all manner of
commercial and civil litigation.
8. I have been retained by the defendants in this case, through their attorney,
Michael A. Jensen, to opine as to whether the fees, costs and expenses charged to the
defendants by Mr. Jensen as to certain matters in connection with the above-captioned
litigation are reasonable, within the scope of my knowledge and experience in practicing
in the area of law in which I practice within the Greater Salt Lake City market, and
whether they comport with the ethical standard of reasonableness imposed by the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5. I have been engaged on an hourly basis, at the
rate of $260,00, to analyze the pertinent case materials, and assess the information
available to me, so as to be able to render a professional opinion.
9.

In the course of preparing to form such an opinion, I interviewed Mr. Jensen

about the background of the case, from its origin to the present, the nature of the case, and
the nature of his clients' involvement in the case. I also asked him as to the nature of his
-4-

involvement in the case, the scope of his engagement and the work actually performed by
him. At my request, Mr. Jensen also allowed me to review all pleadings and papers filed
in connection with the attorneys fees claimed as contained on the Summary & Outline of
Fees Incurred During the Trial Phase, Exhibit "A" hereto, and the Summary Table of Fees
and Costs, Exhibit "B" hereto.
10. From the documents I was provided, I took note of the various hourly rates
charged by Mr. Jensen during the course of the litigation as reflected on Exhibits "A" and
"B", and noted that they ranged from between $175.00 to $200.00 per hour. It is my
understanding that these charges began in 2000 at $175 per hour and have continued
through today at the current rate of $200. I particularly noted that lawyers associated with
my law firm and with similar lengths of experience (viz., 1995 or 1996 law school
graduates) charged similar rates for the same relevant period of time.
11. In determining the reasonableness of the $175 to $200 hourly rates charged by
Mr. Jensen, I note that Mr. Jensen graduated with a Bachelor's degree from the University
of Utah, and with an MBA degree from Harvard University. Following a successful
business career, Mr. Jensen graduated cum laude from the Boston College Law School in
1995, and he began practice in Utah in 1995.
12. I also reflected on my own personal experiences with Mr. Jensen, which have
left me with the impression of him as a clear thinking, creative and detailed oriented
lawyer, with the highest standards of professionalism.
-5-

1 3 , 1 took note from the file I reviewed that the case at issue was a case involving
a variety of claims that, despite the amount of damages claimed, fall within the category
of complex commercial litigation. I further took note that a large number of filings had
occurred during the relevant time period, which required a great deal of time in assessing
an appropriate strategy for response and which required a great deal of reading, review
and analysis, in addition to the drafting of papers and affidavits by Mr. Jensen for filing,
14. To determine whether such filings were reasonable and appropriate, and to
determine whether the overall amount charged for such services appeared reasonable with
the standards of Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, I took approximately
2.25 hours in reviewing and comparing the pleadings and papers filed by Mr. Jensen, as
listed on Exhibits "A" and "B" hereto, to the corresponding papers filed by opposing
counsel.
15. In looking at the overall amount charged, I considered of particular
significance (1) the hourly rate charged for the service; (2) the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly; (3) the issues involved and the result obtained; (4) the time
constraints and number of motions involved in the circumstances of the case; (5) the
experience, reputation and ability of Mr. Jensen, and (6) the fact that the fee arrangement
is hourly.
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16. Upon consideration and reflection of the overall fee charged for the services
described in Exhibit "A" and "B" hereto, in light of my own skill, knowledge, experience
and training, and keeping in mind the requirements of Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 1.5, it is my opinion that (a) the hourly rates charged by Mr. Jensen are
within the range of reasonableness for the services provided within the jurisdiction of the
Greater Salt Lake City area, and (b), in particular, that the overall fees charged by
Mr. Jensen, as set forth on Exhibits "A" and "B" are well within the range of
reasonableness for the services provided within the jurisdiction of the Greater Salt Lake
City area.
17. Although I have utilized a caption for this affidavit that was provided by
Mr. Jensen, the entire contents of the affidavit were prepared by me, and not Mr. Jensen.
DATED this O day of April, 2005.

R. Willis Orton

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this fe^day of April, 2005

•

•K^rrrsro'

" N o t a r y P u b l i c " " ""1
BAUNA DAVIS
.
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
I
60 East South Temple
•
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
i
My Commission Expires
I
March 1.2006,
.

Tl2Gmi~A-

NOTARY PUBLIC

@PFDesktop\::ODMA/PCDOCS/DOCS/820612/t

-7-

X-

Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During The Trial Phase
Prepared February 28, 2005

Item

Description

1

Review Complaint; prepare Answer; throughout
proceedings, prepare procedural pleadings for
scheduling, notices, conferences, and hearings;
throughout proceedings, client consultations

5.1

2

Prepare motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment: Cause of Action ("COA") 1

5.8

$1,031

3

Discovery activities, including Defendants'
requests for discovery and Plaintiffs' requests
for discovery

8.4

$1,493

4

Prepare motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment: COA 2

4.5

$800

5

Oppose Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion or motion to
"Reinstate" claims

2.2

$391

6

Prepare motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment: COA 3 and COA 4

13.5

$2,400

7

Oppose Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on COA 3, including affidavits and
motions to strike Plaintiffs hearsay testimony

14.3

$2,542

8

Prepare for and attend hearing on summary
judgment motions, including preparation and
delivery of courtesy copies the Court's clerk

3.3

$587

9

Prepare affidavits of attorney fees; prepare
memoranda in support of fees and in opposition
to Plaintiffs' filed objections and affidavits

7.8

$1,387

Hours

TOTALS

64.9

Amount*
!

$907

1

$11,538 _ J

* The amount for each category was determined by multiplying the number of hours
times the blended hourly rate of $177.7812. The total amount of $11,538, is consistent
with the Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed December 26, 2001.

Exhibit A

SUMMARY TABLE OF FEES AND COSTS
February 28, 2005
| Exhibit j

1
1
11 D

A
B
C

Description of Fees
Trial Court Proceedings
Post-Trial Collection Proceedings
Appeal Costs
Apneal Proceedings
Estimate of' Proceedings on Remand
TOTALS (except on Remand)

Amount
Sought

Amount
Paid

Amount
Unpaid

$11,538

$6,050

$5,488 1

$2,107

$0

$2,107 1

$575

$0

$575

$10,200

$0

$10,200

$4,120

$0

$4,120

$28,540

$6,050

$22,490 |

DATED this 28th day of February 2005.

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Defendants

1

The estimate for fees on remand mclude actual times spent plus 3.5 hours of
estimated time for attending the hearing set for March 7, 2005 and to prepare and submit
a final order and judgment, including findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Custom\Bievins3\Summary of Fees February 28, 2005
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Exhibit B

Tab 8

Russell D. Hartill (#8729)
Attorney at Law
HOW 9000 S Suite 1
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)561-4797
Fax (801) 561-4798
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

Steven & Debra Blevins
Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT

v.
Case: 000906072
Custom Steel Fabrication INC.,
Defendant

Judge: L A . Dever

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

Russell D. Hartill, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and says:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah since May 17, 2000.1
graduated with a JD degree in May of 1996 from the University of Idaho. I am
currently engaged in private practice dealing with breach of contract and collection
matters, among other issues.
My billing rate for such matters is $125 per hour for non-court appearances and
$175 per hour for courtroom work. My rates have not changed since May 17, 2000.
Included with this affidavit is a copy of my legal representation agreement which
states my rates. My practice is that of a sole practitioner, with no affiliations with

any other attorneys, and I am located at 140 West 9000 South, Suite 1, Sandy,
UTAH 84070.

Ln
Signed and dated this 1 lah
day of April, 2005, in Sandy City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

Russell D. Hartill
Attorney at Law

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
The foregoing affidavit was acknowledged before me this 11th day of April, 2005 and RUSSELL D.
HARTILL, who is personally known to me or who has produced a driver's license as identification, signed
same in my presence this day.

SUSAN TERESA HARTJLLI

| &f%®te$b N0TARY PUBLIC' STATE of UTAH
& QttVte 1 0 1 9 2 SANNOR HILL ROAD
SANDY UT 84092
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 05-22-2007

Susan Teresa Hartill

LEGAL REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT
This agreement is dated this
day of
, between
(hereinafter
"Client") and RUSSELL D. HARTILL of 140 West 9000 South, Suite 1, Sandy, Utah 84070 (hereinafter
"Attorney").
1 An initial retainer of
is to be paid by the Client before representati^
commences This retainer shall bind the Attorney not to take a fee from or represent'any other person invoked
in this matter. It shall constitute partial consideration for the Attorney's representation ofthe Client. The
Attorney may apply the retainer against legal services performed for the C l i e # | l l | J b r costs and expenses
incurred by the Attorney. The retainer need not be placed into the Attorney's trust account and may be
immediately deposited by the attorney into his general earned income funds. It is uncf^|pod and agre^dby the
Client that the bill to be rendered by the Attorney will reflect one or more ofthe followife|:
a. The rate of $ 125 per hour for matters not related to court preparation and the rate of $ 175 per*hour for court
preparation and appearances.
b. Assistance of a paralegal at an hourly rate of between $3!@Jto $75 per hour.
c. Assistance of another attorney at their hourly rate of between $v150 to $200 per hour, at the discretion of
Attorney.
d The complexity and difficulty ofthe matter.
e. The amount involved or the results obtained5:
f. The time limitations imposed by the Clienffor oy oxner circumsxances.
g. The nature, substance and length of documenttdrafted.
h. The stress ofthe matter.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that Client wishe$ Attorney to be available for

2. Interim billings will L ^§^bmitted to the Client from time to time and shall be due and payable in full upon
receipt. Failure to pay ill^eiffefl^iliings within thirty (30) days after date appearing on the billing will permit the
Attorney, at his option, after reaflMbte notice to the Client, to terminate his representation ofthe Client. All
accounts which are not paid in full within shinty (30) days after receipt of any statement shall bear interest on the
unpaid balance at the rate of 1.50% per month or an ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE of 19.56%. The amount
of any FINANCE CHARGE cannot be determined at this time. The charging of this interest will in no way be
deemed a waiver ofthe Attorney's right to withdraw for nonpayment or as a waiver of his right to withdraw as
counsel under any other circumste&e. In addition, during the course of representation, the Attorney may require
the Client to pay additional sums to be applied against anticipated legal services and costs to be rendered and
incurred in the future. Failure to pay such additional sums when requested shall entitle the Attorney to withdraw
as counsel for Client. Additionally, the Attorney may exercise this right, at his option, any time that the Client's
account is past due. The Client agrees to pay any and all costs of collection including reasonable Attorney's fees
whether for time incurred by Attorney or other legal counsel. In order to secure the amount owed Attorney,
Client grants Attorney a lien on any property awarded client or owned by Client, whether or not related to the
legal matter in which Client is involved.
3. The hourly time charges for the Attorney or any assistant include, but are not limited to court appearances,
telephone conferences relating to Client's matter whether with Client or anyone else, office conferences, legal
research, preparation for and attendance at depositions, review of file materials and documents sent or received,
preparation for trials, hearings and conferences with other counsel or office staff, travel time from the Attorney's

office and back to the Attorney's office, and drafting of pleadings, instruments, correspondence and office
memoranda
4 The Client also agrees to assume and pay for all costs incurred by the Attorney in connection with this mattei
An example of such costs include, secretarial assistance, paralegal assistance at a rate determined by the
Attorney to be fair and reasonable, filing fees, witness fees, mileage, sheriffs and constable's fees, expenses of
depositions, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, copy and printing costs, long distance charges, and
other expenses incidental to the representation of the Client.
^ J*L^
5. The Client understands that in some cases a court may or may not award attorney's fees to one party and ma>
order the other party to pay the amount awarded. This is solely at the discreti^ofethe court. In other cases, if
there is a settlement agreed to by both parties, thereby avoiding further action on tS^l^wsmtfcJJie settlement
agreement may provide that one of the parties will contribute to the other party's legal!expenses. In the event
such a contribution is obtained for the benefit of the Client, the imount, when received oy the Attorney, will be
credited against any amount remaining due once it is actually received. However, the Client;nyndersj;ands that h<
or she is primarily responsible for immediate payment of the Attorney's bill.
c
^ S ^
6. The Client agrees to cooperate with the Attorney in a M l ^ ^ t s in relation to this matfelr, including, but not
necessarily limited to, completely and accurately disusing tcTfcfte Attorney all facts related to the matter,
providing the Attorney with copies of all papers a ^ ^ c u m e n t s related to the matter, allowing the Attorney to
conduct all negotiations related to the matter and*Sllov$hg the Attorney to employ the services of additional
legal counsel or legal assistants as Attorney may determine is reasonable.
7. Client recognizes that because of practical and ethical considerations Attorney may not be able to withdraw
from Client's case because of the status of the pro^eding absent the Client's express termination of Attorney's
services. Accordingly, anytime Client is delinquent ffefhe paymsntjgfthe amount due or requested by Attorney
Client consents that Attorney n@l|^M%i ncur a n y \ u t - o f ^ e k e t expenses that would normally be incurred on
Client's behalf, Client relieves Attorney from the obligation, that Attorney may normally have to represent
Client zealously, and waives and releases Attorney from an^damage that resulting from Attorney's negligence
that would otherwise,be^civilly and ethically actionable against Attorney. Any dispute that Client may have wit
the amount due Attornef or services rendered by the Attorney, shall be communicated in writing to the Attorne
immediately upon the disputel^sing, but not greater than thirty (30) days from the date Client is provided any
request for payment of services"fifeL^isputes.
3. THE CLIENT ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIVING A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT, THAT THE CLIENT
HAS READ AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS EACH AND EVERY TERM OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND
AGREES TO EACH-AND EV1JRY/TERM CONTAINED IN IT, AND UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS IS A
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY AND THE CLIENT.

CLIENT

RUSSELL D. HARTILL, ATTORNEY
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Philip A. Reichenbach, #08260
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 377
Centerville, Utah 84014-0377
Telephone: 801-255-2055
Facsimile: 877-349-4103
Email: preichl2@hotmail.com
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP A.
REICHENBACH
Civil No. 000906072

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC.,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
County of Davis

Judge L.A. Dever

)
:ss
)

Philip A. Reichenbach (Affiant), being first duly sworn and under oath deposes and
states:
1.

I am at least eighteen years of age and am competent to testify in a Court of law.

2.

I am an Attorney and am currently licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

3.

I have practiced for over six years, having been admitted to the Utah Bar on October 20,

1998. My practice has included several collection matters and several cases alleging breach of
contract.

Affidavit ofPhilip A. Reichenbach
Page 1 of 3

4.

I was approached by Steven Blevins, one of the Plaintiffs, to prepare this Affidavit. I had

not met him before he approached me to prepare this document.
5

1 have billed clients between 4120 00 and $165.00 per hour for my time. The

overwhelming majority of my time is billed at $125.00 per hour.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED THIS

/ /"^

.,2005.

day of _

PHILIP A. REICHENBACH
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
fpCkb

j f^'

day of

,2005.

\^U.1
WTARY PUBLIC
KARAUCfTOS

Affidavit ofPhilip A. Reichenbach
Page 2 of 3

71»1

FVt

Tab 9

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

Filed 04/13/2005

r\l¥K

Counsel for Defendants
TN THE THTRD JUDTCTAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED ON REMAND
(Post Appeal Fees)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the same as I have stated herein.
2.

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services for

Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action, including
on appeal and on remand for post-appeals proceedings.
4.

The post-appeal proceedings have been extensive, including many requests made

by the Court for memoranda, hearings, and affidavits from local attorneys on the issue of
attorney fc^ and uilliiig idles. A COpj^
5.

Of m y d u U u l o d u u h u g l c u u l d b d i e a t t a c h e d l i e i e l u .

During the period on remand, I have spent 24.60 hours, not counting any time for

preparing a final judgment or findings of fact and conclusions of law. At my current billing
rate of $200 per house, the total fees on remand are $4,920.00.
6.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to those

charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar activities.
7.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

Much of the work on remand resulted from objections by Plaintiffs for costs on appeal and
resulted from requests of the Court.
DATED this 13th day of April 2005.

Michael A. Jensen
On the 13th day of April 2005, personally appeared before me, Michael A. Jensen, the
signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he did execute the same and that
the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the best of his information and belief.

Custom\Bievins3\Aff Fees on Remand April 13, 2005

2-

Notary Pubiic
•
KATHRYNG.JEJISEM I
730 Thrti Fbunttfnt Drive, Untt 871
Murray, Utoh 64107
|
My Cdminfetion Expires
•
Jiflowy 15,200*
I
State of Utah
,

CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,

Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
ON REMAND (Post Appeal Fees) by personally mailing a copy to:

Steven B levins
10758 South 1090 East
Sandy, Utah 84094
(801)571-7601

DATED this 15th day of April 2005.

MICHAEL A. JEN

CustomYBlevins3\Aff Fees on Remand April 13, 2005
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4/12/2005
10:18 AM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

1

Selection Criteria
Activity (hand selec
Slip.Classiflcation
Client (hand select)

Include: Post Appeal
Open
Include: Custom3 Blevins

Rate Info - identifies rate source and level

User
Slip ID
Dates and Time
Activity
Posting Status
Client
Description
Reference
16234
TIME
Jensen
10/8/2004
Post Appeal
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone call to Clients; draft andI
file Request for Scheduling Conference.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Jensen
16233
TIME
10/18/2004
Post Appeal
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conference with Court's
clerk to reset date for Scheduling
Conference; draft and file Motion to Reset
Date of Conference; mail copy to Blevins;
file and deliver Motion to Reception area for
Judge Dever.

0.70
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

140.00

Jensen
16249
TIME
Post Appeal
10/20/2004
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft and file Request for Order
and Order; telephone call from Court's Clerk
re Rufe 34.

0.70
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

140.00

16414
TIME
Jensen
Post Appeal
11/19/2004
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: review file; draft
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and compile billing
records to file with Court at Scheduling
Conference; draft Order to Refund Appeals
Bond; attend Scheduling Conference,

1.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

300.00

Jensen
Post Appeal
Custom3 Blevins

7.90
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

1580.00

16466
TIME
12/4/2004
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: draft
Memorandum on Attorney Fees and
assemble exhibits in support.

200.00 ~~
T@1

Slip Value

80.00

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

4/12/2005
10:18 AM

Page

User
Activity
Client
r Reference
Jensen
Post Appeal
Custom3 Bievins

Units
DNBTime
Est. Time
Variance
2.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

200.00
T@1

440.00

Jensen
16544
TIME
12/22/2004
Post Appeal
WIP
Custom3 Bievins
Post Appeal Proceedings: draft Request to
Submit for Decision and file same with Reply
Memorandum.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

40.00

Jensen
Post Appeal
Custom3 Bievins

0.10
0.00
0,00
0.00

200.00
T@1

20.00

16830
TIME
Jensen
2/28/2005
Post Appeal
WIP
Custom3 Bievins
Post Appeal Proceedings: analyze affidavits
supporting request for attorney fees; prepare
Outline of Fees During Trial Phase; prepare
Summary Table of Fees and Costs; organize
and prepare courtesy copies of affidavits
and deliver same to Judge Dever's Clerk;
mail Outline and Summary to Bievins and
Clients.

3.40
0.00
0.00
0,00

200.00
T@1

680.00

16831
TIME
Jensen
3/7/2005
Post Appeal
WIP
Custom3 Bievins
Post Appeal Proceedings: attend hearing
with Judge Dever on issue of attorney fees
[ESTIMATED TIME]

1.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

300,00

16832
TIME
3/7/2005
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: prepare final
order and judgment; mail copy to Bievins;
submit to Court [ESTIMATED TIME].

Jensen
Post Appeal
Custom3 Bievins

2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

400.00

16991
3/29/2005
WIP

Jensen
Post Appeal
Custom3 Bievins

0.70
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

140.00

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
16527
TIME
12/21/2004
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: receive and
review Memorandum from Bievins; draft
Reply Memorandum.

16829
TIME
2/4/2005
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: receive and
review Minute Entry re Attorney's Fees.

TIME

2

4/12/2005
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Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Slip ID
User
Dates and Time
Activity
Posting Status
Client
Description
Reference
Post Appeai Proceedings: receive Minute
Entry from Judge Dever requesting affidavits
concerning billing rates; telephone
conference with attorney Willis Orton re
affidavit; telephone conference with John
Weston re affidavit; telephone conference
with Kent Alderman re affidavit

Page

3

Units
DNBTime
Est. Time
Variance
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

Jensen
17012
TIME
Post Appeal
3/31/2005
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Post Appeai Proceedings: review files and
meet with Willis Orton re attorney fees and a
review of case.

0.80
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

160.00

17034
TIME
Jensen
4/6/2005
Post Appeal
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Post Appeal Proceedings: exchange e-mail
letters with attorney John Weston re
affidavit; review and organize files in
preparation to meet with Willis Orton; meet
with Willis Orton to review and examine
pleadings; meet with Orton and answer
questions as necessary; review affidavit for
technical correctness.

1.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

320.00

Jensen
17048
TIME
Post Appeal
4/7/2005
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: exchange e-mail
messages with attorney John West re his
affidavit.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

20.00

Jensen
17058
TIME
Post Appeal
4/8/2005
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: telephone call
from attorney Orton re his affidavit; read and
review said affidavit.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

60.00

Jensen
17066
TIME
Post Appeal
4/12/2005
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Post Appeal Proceedings: prepare and file
Defendants' Affidavits on Attorney Fees from
Local Attorneys; update and prepare "post
appeai attorney fees on remand."

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

100.00

<zw

4/12/2005
10:18 AM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Activity
Client
Reference

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance

Billable
Unbillable
Total

24.60
0.00
24.60

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

Grand Total
4920.00
0.00
4920.00
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax:519-9264

. - u . v i K i l i CGURi

Filed 12/06/2004

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/7325 (Shandra/Debbie/Darla) S35

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

MEMORANDUM ON ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

This post-judgment and post-appeal matter came before this Court in the form of a
Scheduling Conference held on November 19, 2004. At the conclusion of the
Conference, this Court requested the parties to submit memoranda on how this Court
should resolve the issues pending on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. At the
direction of this Court, this first memorandum is to be submitted by those Defendants
who prevailed on appeal. Plaintiffs will then have 10 days to respond, and Defendants
may, if they choose, file a reply memorandum prior to submitting this matter for decision.

RELEVANT FACTS ON THE ISSUES OF FEES AND COSTS
1. Plaintiffs commenced their lawsuit against Defendants for breach of a prior
Settlement Agreement that contained a provision for attorney fees to the prevailing party.
2. Certain Defendants, namely Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc., Mark Garamendi and
Heidi Bishop, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis of res judicata, and this Court
granted said motion. Accordingly, on May 2, 2001, this Court entered an order and
judgment dismissing these particular three Defendants from the lawsuit.
3. The remaining Defendants, Randy Isaacson, Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and
Wendy Garamendi, then filed a series of motions for summary judgment on each of the
four causes of action; all four causes of action were subsequently dismissed.
4. Counsel for Defendants then submitted on December 7, 2001, his affidavit of
attorney fees, including detailed billing records. The amount of fees sought in such
affidavit were $10,354.
5. Based on the vigorous objections filed by Plaintiffs and based on the wellestablished principal of "fees for fees," counsel for Defendants filed on
December 26, 2001, an amended affidavit of fees seeking $11,538.
6. Without hearing or comment, this Court then awarded on February 1, 2002,
attorney fees for Defendants in the amount of $6,050.
7. After extensive efforts to collect from Plaintiffs the judgment entered against
them, the judgment amount of $6,050 was paid to Defendants on May 1, 2002, following
a hearing held on April 12, 2002, at which hearing this Court denied the attempt by
Plaintiffs to characterize the $6,050 as a supersedeas bond.

-2-

8. Immediately following this Court's ruling, counsel for Defendants filed a Motion
to Augment Judgment and submitted in support his First Affidavit of Attorney Fees and
Costs Relating to the Collection of Judgment.
9. On May 8, 2004, this Court declined to rule on Defendants' Motion to Augment
and merely filed the Motion and Order unsigned.
10. After multiple attempts to obtain a signed order, this Court eventually signed on
September 22, 2002, without hearing or comment, an order denying any fees and costs to
Defendants that they incurred during the collection phase of these proceedings.
11. Both orders of this Court, the judgment entered on February 1, 2002, and the
order entered on September 22, 2002, were appealed in two separate appeals. These
appeals were subsequently consolidated into one appeal.
12. On June 10, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision
which reversed the two orders of this Court and remanded for a determination of such
fees consistent with the Decision. The Decision, however, was silent on the issue of
whether attorney fees were to be awarded on appeal.
13. After Defendants filed a Petition for Rehearing, the Utah Court of Appeals
issued on August 5, 2004, an Amended Memorandum Decision, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. This Amended Decision expressly provides for attorney
fees on appeal and such fees are to be determined by this Court on remand.
14. On October 8, 2004, Defendants filed, pursuant to Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P.,
their Verified Bill of Costs.
15. On October 21, 2004, Plaintiffs filed objections to Defendants' request for costs,
but they did not dispute the amount of such costs.
-3-

16. Consistent with the Amended Memorandum Decision from the Court of
Appeals, counsel for Defendants filed on November 19, 2004, his affidavit of attorney
fees incurred on appeal.
PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF FEES AND COSTS
It appears that there are five issues to be resolved by this Court.
1. What amount of costs on appeal, as provided by Rule 34(d), should be awarded,
2. What amount of attorney fees during the trial phase of these proceedings should
be awarded. The initial amount sought was $11,538; the amount awarded was $6,050.
3. What amount of attorney fees and costs should be awarded during the collection
phase of these proceedings. The amount sought was $2,035 in fees and $72 in costs, for a
total amount of $2,107; no amount was awarded.
4. What amount of attorney fees should be awarded on appeal; the amount sought is
$10,020 and such amount is supported by affidavit and billing records.
5. What amount of attorney fees should be awarded for the proceedings on remand,
such amount being determined at the conclusion of these post-appeal proceedings.
OPTION 1:
Defendants recommend that this Court hold an evidentiary hearing on all five issues1
set forth above. In advance of such a hearing, either side should be required to submit the
identities of any witnesses, giving each party reasonable time to submit the identities of
rebuttal witnesses. Defendants urge the Court to severely limit the number of such
1

The Costs on appeal should be summarily granted, since Plaintiffs do not dispute the
amount of such Costs and there is no legally cognizable basis to object to such Costs.
-4-

witnesses and the amount of time for hearing; 1-2 hours and 1-2 witnesses are suggested.
Following such hearing, this Court should then enter findings of fact and judgment on
each of the five issues.
OPTION 2:
Alternatively, Defendants recommend that this Court enter findings of fact and
judgment based on the pleadings submitted, provided, however, that Plaintiffs do not
support any of their objections by third-party affidavits. If Plaintiffs intend to support
their objections by testimony from third parties, such witnesses should be subject to cross
examination by Defendants. This is particularly important because during the trial phase,
Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of a local attorney. It is clear that his testimony was
based on biased and incomplete information and was also based on a misapprehension of
the law.2 Previously, Defendants had no opportunity to challenge the opinions of such
attorney or to conduct voir dire.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FEES AND COSTS
To facilitate these proceedings and to avoid lengthy and costly litigation to
determine the amount of fees and costs to be awarded, Defendants set forth herein their
arguments in support of the fees and costs sought. For expediency and to assist the Court,
Defendants attach hereto each of their previously submitted affidavits for fees and costs.

2

In the affidavit submitted during the trial phase, attorney Stephens indicated that the
amount in controversy was only about $6,000. That is clearly in error, since Plaintiffs' pleadings
expressly asserted claims exceeding 516,000 on one cause of action, plus attorney fees and costs.
Further, Mr. Stephens opined that fees should be in relation to the amount in controversy.
Utah's appellate courts, however, have rejected such a notion.
-5-

Issue No. 1: Bill of Costs on Appeal
Defendants timely filed their Verified Bill of Costs incurred on appeal, seeking a
total amount of $575.97, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Rule 34(d),
Utah R. App. P., expressly states that if no objections are filed within five days of such
filing, "the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the
party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the
same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record."
First, Plaintiffs did not file their objections until the passage of 13 days. Rule 34(d)
mandates the action by the clerk of the trial court:
The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and
file a notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the
trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the
clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the
party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket
with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record.
By any standard, the clerk of the trial court failed to comply with Rule 34(d). There
is no discretion given to the clerk. The term "shall" mandates that the clerk enter
judgment as filed, since Plaintiffs failed to object within the required "5 days." Further,
the clerk is also mandated to enter judgment even if Plaintiffs timely object:
If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon
reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final
determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment
docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of
record.
Although not timely opposed, the clerk is not to be absolved of her duty when
Plaintiffs belatedly filed their objections. That would provide a greater advantage to a

late filer than to a timely filer. Even if Plaintiffs are excused from filing their objections
within five days, the clerk is required to enter judgment. Only after judgment has been
entered, and within five days of such entry, may this Court review the judgment:
"The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court upon the
request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment."
This Court is not authorized to review the determination of the clerk until after entry
of the judgment. Accordingly, this Court should instruct the clerk of the trial court to
enter judgment and strictly comply with Rule 34(d).
Second, Plaintiffs do not object to the amount of costs sought by Defendants.
Rather, Plaintiffs appear to object only to the intent of Rule 34(d), believing that
Defendants are not entitled to any costs. Plaintiffs failed to raise this issue on appeal.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no legally cognizable basis to now object to the award of
costs to Defendants.

Issue No. 2: Attorney Fees during trial phase.
The initial amount sought for attorney fees during the trial phase was $11,538. See
Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees, attached hereto as Exhibit C.3 Without hearing or
comment, the Court awarded $6,050. However, the Court first found that the fees sought
by Defendants were reasonable, stating that"... after reviewing the affidavit of attorney

3

The Amended Affidavit does not duplicate the extensive billing records attached to the
initial Affidavit. The initial Affidavit and billing records are attached hereto as Exhibit D.
-7-

fees submitted by Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, orders .. ."
Notwithstanding this Court's finding that the fees sought by Defendants were reasonable,
and notwithstanding that Defendants sought $11,538 tn fees, this Court entered $6,050 as
the amount to awarded.
On the issue of attorney fees, the Utah Supreme Court has demanded detailed
findings to "cdisclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached.'" Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev, Corp, v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.,
909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) {quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987)).
In Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court
stated the following:
The findings here appear to me to state little more than the trial
court's ultimate legal conclusion. In contrast, this court has always
demanded findings sufficiently detailed to "'disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.m Butler,
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909
P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) [quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 121 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987)). We demand detailed findings because the
reasonableness of an attorney fee award is a highly fact-sensitive legal
determination and '"detailed findings are necessary to enable this court to
meaningfully review the issues on appeal.1" State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 788 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah
Ct App. 1990)); see Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 269 ("Although a trial
court has discretion to determine an award of attorney fees, the exercise of
that discretion must be based on an evaluation of the evidence."); Cabrera
v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985) ("An award of attorneys fees
must generally be made on the basis of findings of fact supported by the
evidence and appropriate conclusions of law.").
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 901 (Utah 1996) {emphasis added).
-8-
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Based on a careful review of the billing records submitted by counsel for Defendants
and based on a careful review of the Court's Docket, attached hereto as Exhibit G, the
amount of fees sought appear to be more than reasonable. The total number of hours
spent by counsel for Defendants leading to judgment against Plaintiffs was 58.5 hours.
An additional 6.4 hours was spent in preparing final orders and defending against
Plaintiffs' objections to the attorney fees sought by Defendants. The total number of
hours by December 26, 2001 was 64.9.
This lawsuit was commenced by Plaintiffs on August 3, 2000. The Amended
Affidavit of Fees was filed on December 26, 2001, a period of 17 months. This
represents only 3.8 hours per month during the litigation. During this period of time,
Defendants conducted discovery (two sets of interrogatories), filed separate motions for
summary judgment on each of the four causes of action, and defended against Plaintiffs'
Rule 59 Motion and against Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiffs' 59 Motion and Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment. Defendants also successfully prevailed on each of their
motions for summary judgment. When examining the details of the procedural steps
taken by Defendants, this Court should find that they were reasonably calculated to
prevail against Plaintiffs. This Court should also find that the amount of time billed for
each itemized task during this 17-month period was reasonable.
For example, the legal work included a review of litigation in a previous bankruptcy
case in which one of the Defendants in this case allegedly had not relinquished certain
-9-

funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that allegation, it was necessary to obtain the affidavit
of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various supporting documents from the
bankruptcy case. This led to the dismissal of the first cause of action. This particular task
required extensive research of documents in the prior bankruptcy case and interviews of
attorney Perkins. Although the first cause of action was a frivolous claim, it nonetheless
required a substantial amount of time to defeat Plaintiffs' claim.
Issue No, 3: Attorney Fees during the collection phase.
Plaintiffs used every possible tactic to avoid paying the judgment entered against
them in the amount of $6,050. Defendants attempted service of a Supplemental Order on
Plaintiffs, but they intentionally avoided service. Service was eventually perfected by
serving Mr. Blevins when he attended a deposition. He then ignored the Supplemental
Order and failed to appear as ordered. Judge Medley authorized a bench warrant for
Mr. Blevins but stayed the execution until a pending hearing was held with this Court.
A garnishment was also attempted but Mr. Blevins had devised a scheme to maintain
a zero balance in his check account but have all checks honored by a check protection
system offered by his bank.
In a bizarre and impermissible manner, Plaintiffs also initiated post-judgment
discovery on Defendants. Defendants were compelled to file a motion for protective
order. Plaintiffs then withdrew their discovery requests. Plaintiffs attempted to shield
$6,050 by first depositing that amount with the clerk of the court and then attempting to
40-

characterize such amount as a supersedeas bond. At a hearing, this Court rejected that
characterization and ordered the amount deposited by Plaintiffs, $6,050, to be paid over to
Defendants.
During this arduous collection process, 11 hours were expended and $72 in costs
were incurred. According to Defendants' First Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs
Relating to the Collection of Judgment, attached hereto has Exhibit E, a total of $2,107
was sought for fees and costs during the collection phase. Without comment, this Court
denied those fees and costs. Again, the Utah Court of Appeals requires this Court to
make specific findings to support such a denial In the alternative, this Court should grant
the request of Defendants for $2,107, since the award of fees to obtain or collect of fees is
authorized by law and the amount of $2,107 is reasonable.
Utah's appellate courts have declared that "fees for fees" is permissible. In Salmon,
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of "fees for fees."
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether
fees incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also
be awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale
articulated in American Federation of Government Employees, AFLCIO, Local 3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S.
App. D.C. 293, 994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993):
Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that the
unavailability of "fees for fees" could render fee-shifting
provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of
the underlying statutes.... An award of "fees for fees" is
not merely a remote descendant of the underlying action
from which it derives. Rather, it is an integral aspect of the
statutory scheme on which the underlying claim is based.
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994 F,2d at 22; see also Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154, 163-64, 110 L.Ed. 2d 134, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990);
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978);
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 614 (1st Cir. 1977). This
rationale is {916 P.2d 896} consistent with our prior case law
awarding attorney fees for appeals where attorney fees are
initially authorized by statute. See First Southwestern
Financial Servs., 875 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah 1994).
Analogously, we have recognized that a contractual obligation
to pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should
also include fees incurred on appeal. In Management Services
v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah
1980), we stated that the purpose of an attorney fees provision
is to indemnify the prevailing party against the necessity of
paying attorney fees and thereby enable him to recover the
full amount of the obligation. Id. at 409. In accordance with
this purpose, we concluded that Ma provision for payment of
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred
by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the
action is brought to enforce the contract." Id. Similarly, the
court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party in a
dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was
entitled, not only to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the
fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness of the fees for
which it was entitled to be indemnified. James Constructors
v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895-96 (Utah 1996)
If the fee-shifting provisions of the Settlement Agreement that gave rise to an award
of fees in this action are to have their intended meaning, Defendants are entitled to an
award of their fees and costs necessarily incurred in collecting the initial award of fees.
Again, if this Court carefully reviews the billing records, attached hereto as Exhibit E,
and submitted in support of the fees sought for collection, it should find those fees and
costs to be reasonable. Accordingly, this Court should award $2,107 to Defendants.
-12- 1 ir

Issue No. 4: Attorney Fees on Appeal.
The Utah Court of Appeals expressly authorized an award to Defendants of their
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. The amount sought by Defendants is
$10,020, and which amount is supported by affidavit and billing records, a copy of which
are attached hereto as Exhibit F. This appeal required two separate docketing statements,
since there were at the beginning two separate appeals. To avoid two separate briefs,
however, a motion to consolidate was made. This was granted so that only one brief was
required.
Based on Plaintiffs' opposing brief, it was appropriate to file a reply brief. Further,
because the Court of Appeals failed to authorize an award of attorney fees on appeal, a
petition for rehearing was filed. The total of 51 hours of legal time should be deemed
reasonable under the circumstances of this appeal. Accordingly, this Court should award
$10,020 in attorney fees to Defendants.
Issue No. 5: Attorney Fees on Remand,
Since "fees for fees" is well established, it is appropriate and reasonable for this
Court to also award reasonable attorney fees to Defendants incurred during the remand
phase of these proceedings. That is, Defendants are entitled to recover their legal fees
incurred in establishing an award of fees. Such potential award is intended to shift the
fees as provided by contract and to act as deterrent against Plaintiffs' frivolous and
prolonged objections against an award of fees. Plaintiffs could at any time agree to pay a
-13-

sum certain to Defendants and end these proceedings. But for Plaintiffs' contentious
defense against an award of fees and costs to Defendants, this matter would be ended and
Defendants would no longer incur any attorney fees or costs.4
From the citation made above,
Similarly, the court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party
in a dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was entitled,
not only to attorney fees on appeal but also to the fees it incurred
establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled
to be indemnified. James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d
665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895-96 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added)
Since the proceedings on remand are for the sole purpose of establishing the
reasonableness of the fees for which Defendants are entitled, the fees incurred on remand
should be awarded to Defendants. While the exact amount of such fees cannot be
determined until the conclusion of the remand proceedings, the amount of time spent so
far, including the drafting and filing of this memorandum, has been slightly more than 11
hours, or in the amount of $2,220. This does not include any further time at hearing, or
preparing a reply memorandum, or in preparing a final order and judgment.

4

For example, Defendants offered a settlement amount to Plaintiffs after the Utah Court
of Appeals issued its Amended Memorandum Decision. Prior to any fees being incurred by
Defendants on remand, total fees and costs sought were 518,191. Plaintiffs were extended an
offer to end this matter with a single payment of $14,000 or monthly payments of $1,100.
Plaintiffs offered no response nor any offer to negotiate a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
should now bear the additional attorney fees for their unwillingness to settle this matter.
-14-
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Once the Court issues its findings and ruling, Defendants will then file and serve a
final affidavit of attorney fees.

CONCLUSION
Defendants seek $18,191 in fees and costs incurred prior to the proceedings on
remand. So far on remand, attorney fees incurred are about $2,220. This brings the
amount sought by Defendants to $20,411. This amount is to be supplemented to the
extent of any additional fees incurred at hearing, in drafting a reply memorandum and in
preparing any final order and judgment.
Defendants recommend a brief hearing without witnesses, or no more than 1-2
witnesses per side. Alternatively, Defendants recommend that the Court rule on the
memoranda submitted, provided that no third-party affidavits are submitted in support or
provided that the Court disallows such affidavits, if any.

DATED this 6th day of December 2004.

Michael A. Jensen / I
Attorney for Defendants

Custom\Blevins3\Request for Order October 20, 2004
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,
Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for the Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing MEMORANDUM ON ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS by mailing a copy to:
Steven and Debra Blevins
10758 South 1090 East
Sandy, Utah 84094

DATED this 6th day of December 2004.

MICHAEL A. JENSEN/Esq.

Custom\Blevms3\Request for Order October 20, 2004
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Court of Appeals Amended Memorandum Decision (08/05/2004)

Exhibit B
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Exhibit C

Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees (12/26/2001)

Exhibit D

Affidavit of Attorney Fees & Billing Records (12/07/2001)

Exhibit E

First Affidavit of Attorney Fees Relating to Collection of
Judgment (04/12/2002)

Exhibit F

Affidavit of Attorney Fees on Appeal (11/19/2004)
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Court's Docket (12/04/2004)
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Steven Blevins and Debra Kay
Blevins,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION1
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Case No. 20020177-CA

v.

F I L E D
(Augusu 5 , 2 0 04)

Randv Isaacson; Linda
Isaacson; Jason Bishop; Wendy
Garamendi; Custom Steel
Fabrication. Inc.; et al.,

]2QQ4 UT App 2 6 5 ,

Defendants and Appellants.

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Leon A. Dever
Attorneys:

Michael A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Steven Blevins and Debra Kay Blevins, Salt Lake City,
Appellees Pro Se

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Randy and Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and Wendy Garamendi
(collectively, Defendants) appeal from two orders of the trial
court. We reverse and remand.
Defendants make two arguments on appeal. Firsu, Defendants
argue that the.trial court's decision to reduce their attorney
fees, incurred as a result of defending a breach of contract
action, was unsupported by findings of fact. Second, Defendants
argue that the trial court's decision to deny them additional

1. This Amended Memorandum Decision replaces the Memorandum
Decision in Case No. 20020177-CA issued on June 10, 2004.

attorney fees, incurred in pursuing enforcement of their initial
award of attorney fees, was likewise unsupported by findings of
fact.
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) . However,
"although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award must
be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact."
Anderson v. Poms, 1999 UT App 207,^9, 984 P.2d 392 (quotations
and citations omitted). Specifically, in determining an award of
reasonable attorney fees, trial courts are required to answer the
following four questions:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
2 . How much of the work performed was
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute
the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent
with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). Indeed,
this court has made it clear that a trial court (ff abuses its
discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees]
requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more of
the above factors." Endrodv v. Endrodv, 914 P. 2d 1166, 1171
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted);
see also Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (noting that trial court erred because it reduced, without
explanation, the prevailing party's attorney fees).
In this case, the trial court determined in its first order
that Defendants' initial request for attorney fees was
"reasonable." However, without providing any explanation or
making any findings of fact, the trial court then reduced the
fees sought by Defendants from $11,538 to $6050, Although
Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a local attorney stating
that Defendants' attorney fees should not exceed $7000, it is not
clear from the trial court's order that this was the reason for
the reduction in the amount of fees awarded. Similarly, the

•20020177-CA

trial court's decision to deny Defendants' request for additional
attorney fees, incurred in enforcing the original judgment, was
unsupported by any findings of fact. In its second order, the
trial court noted only that the additional fees requested were
"unreasonable."
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's reduction in
Defendants' initial award of attorney fees and its subsequent
denial of Defendants' request for additional attorney fees
constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we remand for
the entry of findings of fact consistent with this decision, and
if appropriate, for an adjustment in the amount of attorney fees
awarded to Defendants by the trial court. Moreover, because the
fee-shifting provision of the settlement agreement entered into
by the parties also allows for the recovery of attorney fees
incurred on appeal, we award Defendants reasonable attorney fees
incurred as a result of this appeal in an amount to be decermined
by the trial court on remand.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Associate--Presiding Judge

James

20020177-PA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of August, 2004, a true and
correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the United
States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be
delivered to:
MICHAEL A. JENSEN
ATTOEJNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 571708
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157-1708
STEVEN BLEVINS
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS
10758 S 1090 E
SANDY UT 84094
HONORABLE LEON A. DEVER
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

J/A/WJAS
T&W&ML
Judicial Secretary
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TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 000906072
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20020177-CA

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)

Filed & Served 10/08/2004

Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

VERIFIED BILL OF COSTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

As provided by Rule 34, Utah R. App, P., Defendants/Appellants, having prevailed
on appeal and the trial court's ruling being reversed and remanded, hereby submit their
verified bill of costs:
Filing Fees (2 consolidated appeals x S190)

S380.00

Printing Brief

$141.06

Printing Reply Brief

S30.69

Printing Petition for Rehearing

S24.22

Total Taxable Costs

S575.97

As provided by Rule 34, Utah R. App. P., Defendants request the Clerk of the trial
court to enter judgment against Steven Blevins and Debra Kav Blevins and in favor of
Defendants Randv Iaacson. Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and Wendv Garamendi.

DATED this 7th day of October 2004.

Michael A. Jensen / /
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
As counsel for Defendants/Appellants, I hereby verify that the costs set forth above
are accurate and correct and in conformance with Rule 34, Utah R. App. P.

Michael A. Jensen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of October 2004,

7

Notary Rbl^lic

AA<*A>

Notary PuWic """ "*

KATHRYNG. JENSEN I

i
Custom\B!evins3Uppea!\Biil of Costs October 7, 2004

^S^^/FJ

^$yx*£r

i 730 Thr»# Fountain* Onvt, IWt 87 «
f
Murray, Utah 84107
f
My CommWon Exptre*
.

J*nutry15,2006
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants.
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for the Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing VERIFIED BILL OF COSTS by mailing a copy to:

Steven and Debra Blevins
10758 South 1090 East
Sandy, Utah 84094

DATED this 8* day of October 200

MICHAEL A. JENSEl^sq.

Cuslom\Blevms3\Appea!\Bill of Costs October 7, 2004
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)

Filed & Served 12/26/2001

Attorney at La>v
730 Three Fountains #87
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 238-74S0; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77323 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the same as I have stated herein.
2.

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.
I

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services

for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action.
4.

I have personally spent more than 76.4 hours representing Defendants in this

action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it
increased to $185 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of $177
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 64.9 hours. At
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $11,538.
5.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to

those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation
activities.
6.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Plaintiffs' Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "nonopposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed.
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A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action,
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal
of their Second Cause of Action.
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, 1fileda third motion for
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.
7.

This Amended Affidavit is for the sole purpose of adding 6.4 hours for research

and drafting a Response to Plaintiffs' Objections and to update and prepare this affidavit.
DATED this 26th day of December 2001.

Michael A. Jensen / J
On the 26{h day of December 2001, personally appeared before me,
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the
best of his information and belief.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Custom\Blevinb3\Jensen AfT3 Fees December 26, 2001
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"Notaiy Public""" "1
LYNDAA.H0LBRO0K ,
Hill UAA* w"7 W W I O T I V I

t

My Commission ExpJrw
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CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,

Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally mailing a copy to:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315

DATED this 26th day of December 2001

MICHAEL A. JEf^SiN

Custom\Blevins3\Jensen A A3 Feos December 26, 2001

-4-

M I C H A E L A. J E N S E N ( 7 2 3 1 )

Filed & Served 12/07/2001

Attorney at Law
730 Three Fountains #87
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Clerk: 23S-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES (MICHAEL A. JENSEN)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., ET AL

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the^same as I have stated herein.
2>

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services

for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action.
4.

I have personally spent more than 70 hours representing Defendants in this

action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it
increased to SI 85 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of SI 77
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 58.5 hours. At
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $10,354.
5.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to

those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation
activities.
6.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Plaintiffs5 Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "nonopposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed.
2

A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action,
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal
of their Second Cause of Action.
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, I filed a third motion for
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint.
7.

I have attached hereto my billing records in this matter.

DATED this 3rd day of December 2001.

Michael A. Jensen

( J

On the 3rd day of December 2001, personally appeared before me,
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the
best of his information and belief.

Cu>som\Bkvms3\Jcnscn A112 Fees December 3, 2001
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CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge LA. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,

Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that oh this day I
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally delivering a copy to:

Ronald L. Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315

DATED this 7th day of December 2001

MICHAEL A. JENj

Custom\Blevins3\;ttns«n AI12 Fees December 3,2001
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Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

'2/02/01
1.13PM

Page

Selection Criteria
Siip Classification

Open

Client (hand select) include: Custom3 Blevins
SliD.Transaction Ty
:

1-1

ate Info - identifies rate source and (eve!

User
SiipiD
Activity
Dates and Time
Client
Posting Status
Description
Reference
Jensen
9127
TIME
Litigation
10/06/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: read and review Complaint withi
Clients.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status
175.00 ~
T@1

87.50

Jensen
9'2S
TIME
Litigation
10/13/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Customs Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

Jensen
5129
TIME
Litigation
10/18/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Client re representation.

0.20
0.00
0.00.
0.00

175.00
T@1

35.00

Jensen
»1*0
TIME
Litigation
10/19/00
Edled
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
L iigation: draft Motion to Dismiss, Motion
to Strike portions of Complaint, and
Motion for a More Definite Statement.

3.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

595.00

Jensen
155
TIME
Litigation
10/30/00
Billed
G:12145
10/31/00 Custom3 Blevins
L ligation: telephone conversation with
Client (Randy)

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

Jensen
Litigation
11/30/00 Custom3 Blevins

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

87.50

111

TIME

11/13/00
5 lied

G:12193

L ligation: telephone conversation with
Richard Perkins re trust funds held by him
aid turned overtto Trustee for Linda
Isaacson's bankruptcy.

Slip Value

12/02/01
2 13 PM

Sup ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
9289
TIME
11/18/00
Billed
G:12193
11/30/00
Litigation: review dates of memoranda
filed on motion to dismiss; draft, file, and
mail Notice to Submit for Decision on
Motion to Dismiss.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

Units
DNB Time
Est Time
Variance
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

175.00
T@1

35.00

S297
TIME
Jensen
11/20/00
Litigation
Billed
G:12193
11/30/00 Custom3 Blevins
L tigation: file, draft, and mail Notice to
S jbmit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss
and to Strike.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

35.00

S607
TIME
Jensen
01/15/01
Litigation
E.IIed
G:12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Richard Perkins re affidavit and when he
will respond.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

Jensen
S303
TIME
Litigation
01/29/01
Billed
G:12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: read and review revisions
requested by Perkins for his affidavit; edit
and revise affidavit; draft letter and fax to
Perkins with revision and redlined version
anc requesting signing to be this week.

0.80
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

140.00

SS11
TIME
Jensen
01/30/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12373
03/31/01 Custom3
L tigation: meet with Richard Perkins at
his office to discuss affidavit and have him
sign it and obtain good copies of exhibits
to attach to affidavit.

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

87.50

3.80
0.00
0.00
nnn

175.00
T@1

665.00

Blevins

Jensen
9645
TIME
Litigation
02 06/01
Billed
G.-.12373
03/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Legation: draft,-file, and serve Notice to
S-omit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss;
draft, file, and serve Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on First Cause of
Ac:ion; draft, file.iand serve Memorandum
in Support of Motion for same; finalize
and incorporate Affidavit of Richard

2

12/02/01

: 13 PM
Shp ID
Dates and Time2
Posting Status
Description
Perkins with Memorandum for SJ.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
. Reference

Page

Units
Rate
DNBTime
Rate Info
Est. Time
Bill Status
Variance _

Slip Value

Jensen
TIME
9955
Litigation
04/09/01
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Billed
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Judge Dever's I aw clerk, Ray, re status of
aecision on two Notices to Submit for
Decision.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

17.50

9957
TIME
04/10/01
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01
Litigation: review Minute Entry of Judge
Dever; draft proposed Order and
Judgment based on Minute Entry; draft
Motion and Memorandum for Attorney
Fees; review billing records and draft
Affidavit in support of attorney fees.

Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

1.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

262.50

>975
TIME
Jensen
04/11/01 .
Litigation
Silled
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Guardianship and/or Conservatorship
Activities: arrange for deliver of
documents ft Mr. Dunn; file documents at
Court.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

35.00

979
TIME
Jensen
C 4/11/01
Litigation
Slled
G:12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Answer to Complaint; draft
First Discovery interrogatories, requests,
a^d admissions; draft Motion for
Scheduling Conference.

3.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

630.00

^C34
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
3^/20/01
Biled
G.12426
04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
- ligation: receive and read Objection to
r
orm of Order; research issues of "with
prejudice" and "on the merits;" draft
Mternative Order; draft, file, and mail
Defendants' Objection to Objection; draft
\mended Motion for Attorney Fees; draft
nd have notarized Amended Affidavit (for
aorney fees).

1.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

280.00

12/02/01
2 13 PM
Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
10098
TIME
04/30/01
Billed
G:12426
04/30/01
Litigation: read and review motions and
memoranda from Dunn.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0 20
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

175.00
T@1

35 00

10138
TIME
Jensen
05/05/01
Litigation
Silled
G12496
05/31701 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft response to Second
Objection to form of Order and request for
attorney fees; draft Second Amended
Motion for Attorney Fees; draft Second
Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees.

1.40
0.00
0 00
0.00

175.00
T@1

245.00

10139
TIME
Jensen
05/05/01
Litigation
Billed
G.12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Memorandum in
Opposition to Rule 59 Motion.

2.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00'
T@1

385.00

10140
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
05/07/01
Billed
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft and file at Court Notice to
Submit on Form of Order, Memorandum
in Opposition, Reponse to Second
Objection, 2nd Amended Motion for
Attorney Fees, and 2nd Amended
Affidavit of Attorney Fees; deliver copies
to Dunn.

0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
'T@1

70.00

10229
TIME
Jensen
05/21/01
Litigation
Silled
G:12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft and file Reply to
Response to Second Amended Motion for
Attorney Fees.

0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

157.50

1C231
TIME
Jensen
05/22/01
Litigation
S.Med
G-12496
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review deposition of Steve
Blevins; review responses to Requests for
Admissions; draft, file and serve Motion
and Memorandum in Support of Partial
Summary Judgment on Second Cause of
Action; read and review first discovery
requests from Dunn.

4.80
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

840,00

A

'2/02/01
1 13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

r

Page

iiDlD
User
Activity
Dates and Time
Client
Posting Status
_ Reference
Description
Jensen
10271
TIME
Litigation
05/30/01
05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Billed
G:12496
Litigation: draft, file, and serve} Reply
Memorandum; draft, file, and :serve Notice
to Submit for Decision.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.70
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

1D359
TIME
Jensen
Litigation
06/19/01
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Customs Blevins
Litiaation: telephone conversation with
Client re Discovery Requests from
Blevins; review faxed responses from

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

Jensen
1 1-358
TIME
Litigation
06/20/01
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: Telephone conference with
Judge Dever and Dunn re schedule to
complete discovery and file dispositive
motions.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00-'

C365
TIME
Jensen
06/21/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
litigation: review responses to Discovery
from Clients; telephone conversation with
Clients re same; draft formal Answers and
Responses and priority mail to Clients for
re/lew and signature.

2.80
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

490.00

52.50

175.00 ~

Slip Value

122.50

T@1

35.00

T@1

Client.
17.50

T@1

0.00

Jensen
3385
TIME
C6/25/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12531
06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Legation: receive completed signature
page faxed from Clients; edit and revise
Discovery Responses and mail and file
same.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

Jensen
^55
TIME
Litigation
:7/12/01
Eiled
G:12571
07/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
- ligation: review discovery responses
Yom Dunn; draft and serve Second
discovery Requests.

1.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

T@1

T@1

227.50

12/02/01
2 13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

SiiolD
User
Dates and Time
Activity
Posting Status
Client
Description
m Reference
Jensen
10649
TIME
08/17/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: receive and read responses to
second discovery requests.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.10
O.OO
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Jensen
10650
TIME
Litigation
08/23/01
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: begin drafting Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment.

6.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

Jensen
10651
TIME
Litigation
08/24/01
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft and mail affidavits to
Clients; research issues of hearsay in
affidavits and accord and satisfaction as it
relates to interest; draft Motion and
Memorandum to Strike Hearsay
Testimony.

4.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

Jensen
1C652
TIME
08/27/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: draft Motion and Memorandum
In Support of Summary Judgment on 3rd
and 4th Causes of Action; telephone
conversation with Client re affidavits and
status of case in general.

7.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

Jensen
1C667
TIME
Litigation
08/29/01
Eiiled
G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: telephone conversation with
Ghent re case and re affidavit; file Motion
and Memorandum for Summary
Judgment; serve Dunn and Client with
copies.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00

10663
TIME
Jensen
08/30/01
.
Litigation
Billed
*G:12627
08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment; file and seo/e same; mail copy
to Client.

2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

175.00
T@1

175.00 ~

Slip Value

17.50

T@1

1102.50

T@1

770.00

T@1

1277.50

T@1

52.50

T@1

420.00

6

12/02/01
2 13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

Slip ID
User
Dates and Time
Activity
Posting Status
Client
Description
Reference
Jensen
10716
TIME
Litigation
09/05/01
Billed
G:12666
09/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: receive and review Notice to
Submit on Summary Judgment; telephone
conversation with Court; review Court's
Docket; draft and fax letter to Dunn; draft
Motion to Strike Notice to Submit.

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.70
0.00
0.00
•0.00

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

'0775
TIME
Jensen
09/19/01
Litigation
Billed
G:12666
09/30/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: review Dunn's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on 3rd and 4th Causes of
Action; draft Reply Memorandum on
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for
Decision; review Dunn's Memo in
Opposition to Motion to Strike Hearsay
Testimony of Steven Blevins; research
Rules of Evidence on Hearsay and
exceptions; draft Reply Memorandum on
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for
Decision on Motion; draft Request for
Hearing on October 30th, date set for
Motion for SJ on 2nd Cause of Action.

5.90
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

1091.50

0347
TIME
Jensen
'0/05/01
Litigation
Silled
G:12707
10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Litigation; meet with Judge Dever's Clerk
re pending motions and need to
consolidate hearing on all such motions.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

•185.00
T@1

37.00

3387
TIME
Jensen
10/1(3/01
G&C
Billed
G:12707
10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
Guardianship and/or Consen/atorship
Activities: meet with Judge Dever's Clerk
-e Request to Hear all Motions and
:onfirm with her that all motions will be
leard on October.30th, subject to any
-a!ay caused by extensive jury trial
^rrently underway.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

18.50

308
TIME
Jensen
0/16/01
,
Litigation
illed
G:12707
10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins
itigation: draft, file and mail Notice of

0.20
0.00
0.000.00

185.00
T@1

37.00

185.00 ~
T@1

Slip Value

129.50

7

12/02/01
2:13 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
Hearing for October 30, 2001.

User
Activity
Client
_ Reference

Page

Units
Rate
DNBTime
Rate Info
Est. Time
Bill Status
Variance __

11110
TIME
Jensen
11/13/01
Litigation
VVIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: meet with Judge Dever's clerk
re schedule for hearing; draft, file and
serve Withdrawal of Motion for
Continuance.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00

11154
11/19/01

0.50
Q.QQ
0.00
0.00

185.00

Jensen
11184
TIME
11/26/01
Litigation
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: organize and select documents
to include as courtesy copies in a binder
for Friday's hearing on motions for
summary judgment.

1.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00'

11215
TIME
Jensen
11/30/01
'
Litigation
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Litigation: prepare for and attending
hearing on Motions for Summary
Judgment; begin draft of Final Order and
Judgment.

2.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00

11218
TIME
Jensen
12/03/01
Litigation
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Legation: obtain copy of Court's docket
and review entries; select from TimeSlips
ail entries for this qase, excluding all costs
and expenses; draft Affidavit of Attorney's
Fees; edit and revise Final Order and
Judgment.

1.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00

WiP

TIME

Jensen
Litigation
Custom3 Blevins

Litigation: review case file and court's
docket; draft and file Amended
Withdrawal of Motion for Continuance;
review Reply Affidavit of Blevins; draft and
file Amended Motion to Strike to include
Reply Affidavit of Blevins,

Gfand Total

Slip Value

55.50

T@1

92.50

T@1

222.00

T@1

388.50

T@1

T@1

259,00

8

Slip Listing
User

Activity
Client
Reference
Billable
Unbillable
Total

^5S

Page
Units
DNB Time.
Est. Time
Variance
65.10
0.00
66.10

__C7.Q

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Siip Value

116S3.50
0 00
11693.50

Oil!^

9

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
730 Three Fountains #87
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

Filed & Served 04/12/2002

Counsel for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLEVTNS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVTNS,

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
RELATING TO THE COLLECTION
OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY ISAACSON, LINDA
ISAACSON, WENDY GARAMENDI,
AND JASON BISHOP,
Defendants.

Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the

informatibn, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would,
testify the same as I have stated herein.

2.

I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services

for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action,
including all efforts to collect on a judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiffs.
4.

I have personally spent more than 10,0 hours in attempting to collect the

Judgment amount of $6,050. In addition, costs were incurred in the amount of $72. The
amount of time includes the preparation of this affidavit and die accompanying Motion to
Augment Judgment. In addition, I expect to spend at least one additional hour at the
hearing set on Plaintiffs' motion on Friday, April 12, 2002. Combined, my total hours in
collection and related matters are 11.0 hours. At my standard billing rate of $185 per
hour, total fees so far in the collection process are $2,035. Adding to that the above costs
(service of process and garnishment fees) of $72, the total amount is $2,107.
5.

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to

those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation
activities.
6.

I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The judgment debtors have vigorously and unreasonably avoided payment and thwarted
were possible all attempts to collect on the Judgment. Defendant Steven Blevins failed to
appear at a Supplemental Proceeding and the Court entered a Bench Warrant, pending the
outcome of the hearing referenced above, Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion to Quash all
-2-

supplemental proceedings and have even served discovery requests on Defendants, I
have had to respond to each of these items. The judgment debtors are solely responsible
for all of these additional legal fees and costs.
7.

This First Affidavit ofAttorney's Fees and Costs Relating to the Collection of

Judgment is for the sole purpose of awarding to Defendants the additional fees and costs
incurred by Plaintiffs1 intransigence.

DATED this 12th day of April 2002.

Michael A. Jensen ( 7
On the 12th day of April 2002, personally appeared before me, Michael A. Jensen,
the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he did execute the same
and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the best of his information
and belief.

Custom\Blevins3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees April 12,2002

-3-

CFRTTFTCATir-.N
Case No. 000906072
Judge L A. Dever

bLLVLNBLEVIMS AND
DFBRA KAY BI FVTNS,

Waintin^,

vs.
CI SI f )M s i KL1 1 \\ili.U AlJON, INC., ET AI,

Defendants.

I, Michael A Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this da> 1
personally served the foregoing FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS RELATING TO THF ( OLLECTION OF JUDGMENT by personally
deliver-no; a COP1' h :

Ronald L Dunn
Attorney at Law
68 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537

DA TED this i: day ot Apnl ~UU.

H^wmafj
MICHAEL A. JE:

Custonv3Ie/ins3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees npnl 12, 20^

04/11/02
2:10 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Page

Selection Criteria
Activity (hand selec Include: Collections; Collections
Slip.Classification
Open
Client (hand select) Include: Custom3 Blevins
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level
User
Slip ID
Activity
Dates and Time
Client
Posting Status
Description
_ Reference
Jensen
11468
TIME
Collections
02/05/02
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: obtain Court's Final
Order and Judgment; draft and file
Judgment Information; draft Supplesmental
Order and obtain from Court.

Rate
Units
Slip Value
DNB Time
Rate info
Est. Time
Bill Status
Variance
1.10 ~
185.00 "~
203.50
T@1
0.00
0.00
0.00

Jensen
11598
EXP
Coiiections
03/04/02
WIP
Customs Blevins
Collection Expenses: Process Server to
Serve Steven Blevins with a
Supplemental Order.

1

42.00

42.00

Jensen
11606
TIME
Coiiections
03/18/02
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Collection Activities: review fax letter and
telephone message from Dunn requesting
continuance of Supp Proceeding; draft
and fax !etter to Dunn re same; telephone
call from Dunn confirming date reset to
3/28/2002.

0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

74.00

Jensen
11618
TIME
Collections
03/19/02
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Collection Activities: telephone call from
Dunn re second change to Supplemental
Proceeding.

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

18.50

Jensen
TIME
11664
Collections
03/28/02
• Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Litigation: review faxed motion from Dunn
to quash supplemental order; draft
Memorandum in Opposition.

2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

444.00

1

0^/11/02
: IOPM

Michael A. Jenssin
Siip Listing

Page

User
Un.ts
SiiD ID
DNB Time
Dates and Time
Activity
Est. Time
Client
Posting Status
Reference
_ _ Vanance
Description
Jensen
0 60
11665
TiME
0 00
Collections
03/29/02
Customs Blevins
0.00
WIP
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum,
r nc
file Memorandum in Opposition to Btevms'
Motion to Quash
laqcpp
11637
uME
04/02/02
He JIOI u
WIP
Customs B'e/ins
Collection Activities: attend Sup plemental
Proceeding; meet with Judge Medley;
attempt to meet with Judge Dever's
cierks; meet with Larry Gobelman re
expediting hearing on Motion to Quasn.

1 20
0 00
0 00

Jensen
Collections
Ci'Stom3 Ble/ins

1

Jensen
T~15
TiME
Collections
04/05/02
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Collection Activities: telephone
conversation with Judge Dever's clerk to
schedule a hearing on Motion to Quash;
draft, file, and serve Notice of Hearing;
review Dunn's postjudgment discovery
requests; research issue of postjudgment
discovery; confer by telephone with a
retired judge on the issue; draft, file and
sen/e Motion and Memorandum for
Protective Order

11756
EXP
04/04/02
WIP
Collection Expenses: Garnishment Fes

Rate
Rate Info
Bnl Status

S.ip Value

185.00
T@1

185.00
T@1

222.00

oro

n(

-

n

]Q 00

2 !U
0 00
0.G0
0.00

185 00
T@1

388 50

11730
TiME
Jensen
04/08/02
Collections
WIP
Custom3 Blevirs
Collection Activities: Litigation: telephone
conversation with Client re hearing this
Friday.

0 30
0 00
0 00
0 00

1S5C0
T£1

55.50

11753
.TIME
Jensen
04/10/02
Collections
WIP
Customs Blevins
Collection Activities: telephone call from
Custom's Bankruptcy attorney in Idaho rn
hearing and appearance of Blevins;
te'eohone conversation with Client re

04.
0.00
0.00
0 00

u . -U

F4.00

T@1

04/11/02
2.10 PM

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
same.

User
Activity
Client
Reference

11755
TIME
04/11/02
WIP
Collection Activities: receive and review
Notice of Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond
faxed to me by Dunn; review Rule 62 re
stays and supersedeas bonds; draft
Motion for Augmented Judgment,
including an Affidavit of Attorney Fees
and Costs; file same with Court; Draft
Bench Warrant consistent with Court's
Order of 4/2/2002; obtain same from
Court.

Jensen
Collections
Custom3 Blevins

Page

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

1.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

185.00
T@1

259.00

10.00

10.00

11757
Jensen
EXP
Collections
04/11/02
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Collection Expenses: Service of Process
to Serve US Bank with Writ of
Garnishment.

Grand Total
Billable
Unbiliable
Total

10.00
0.00
10.00

1922.00
0.00
1922.00

3

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 841574708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

Filed & Served 11/19/2004

Counsel for Defendants
JLN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 841 i 1-1860
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk; 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37

STEVEN BLLVINS AND
DLBRA KAY BLEVINS,

AI1JDAV IT OF AJLTOKNEY'S
FFFS INCURRED (!f\ \PPFAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION,
INC., FT AL

Case No. 00090607?.
Incise LA. Dever

Defendants,
STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COt'iN 1 \ Ob SALJ LAKi
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
I

[ an over the a^3 of twenty-onr vear>, ;m^ I am competent to provide the

information, under oath, that is contained in diis Affidavit. This information is based on
my personal knowledge, If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and v/onM
teblifv the suae (.LJ 1 hu\ e stated ncrein.
I am iesal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action.

3.

Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services for

Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action, including
on appeal.
4.

Two appeals were commenced, and those appeals were consolidated into a single

appeal. When the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision, it omitted any
reference to attorney fees on appeal. Accordingly, I filed a Petition for Rehearing, and it was
granted. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued an Amended Memorandum Decision in
which it added a ruling that attorney fees incurred on appeal were appropriate and were to be
determined by the trial court on remand.
5.

During the period from February 27, 2002 through June 23, 2004,1 personally

spent 51 hours on the appeals for my clients. My hourly rate during the foregoing period of
time was $200, for a total billing of $10,200. A copy of my detailed billing records are
attached hereto.
6.

My activity during the appeals phase of these proceedings included the following:
a.

File two appeals;

b.

Prepare two Docketing Statements;

c.

File a Motion to Consolidate both appeals;

d.

File Motion for Summary Disposition;

e.

Respond to Plaintiffs* Motion to Dismiss Appeal;

f.

Prepare and file Brief;

g.

Prepare Reply Brief based on fallacious statements in Plaintiffs' Brief;

h.

Prepare and file Petition for Rehearing;

i.

Conduct research on all issues for Docketing Statements, Briefs, and Petition
for Rehearing.
-2-

I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar appeal activities,
!I

I belle" ;,e that the time 1 spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances.

The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to
properly present the issues to the Coi irt o r Appeals an«l to iDftnd ;i" lin \\ H.ihuifrY
Motion to Dismiss,

.• •

DATED this I1/1 day oi November du04,

Michael A. Jensen

/

/

On the 19:n day of November 2004, personally appeared before me,
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the
best of his information and belief,

Custom\Blcvins3\Jensen Aff4 Fees on Appeal November 19, 2004

CERTIFICATION
Case No. 000906072
Judge L.A. Dever

STEVEN BLEVINS AND
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL,

Defendants.

I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
ON APPEAL by personally delivering in open court a copy to:

Steven B levins
10758 South 1090 East
Sandy, Utah 84094
(801) 571-7601

DATED this 19m day of November 2004.

MICHAEL A. JENS

Custom\Blevins3VJensen Aff4 Fees on Appeal November 19, 2004

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

8/9/2004
8:38 PM

Paqp

Selection Criteria
Activity (hand se!ec Include: Appeals
Slip.Classification
Open
Client (hand select) include Custom^ F l ^ i n :
Slip.Transaction T ; 1 I

Rate Info - identifies rate source and level

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

Rate
Rate info
Biil Status

Slip Value

200.00
T@1

100.00

11601
TIME
Jensen
3/8/2002
Appeals
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: review• letter from Suprerne
Court; review Appellate Rules; draft and file
Certificate That Transcript is Not Required.

0.^0
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

80.

11602
TIME
3/19/2002
WIP
Appeals Activity: draft and file Decreeing
Statement.

Jensen
Appeals
Customs Ble/ins

3.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T©1

680..

11603
TiME
3/19/2002
WIP
Appeals Activity: draft diid tile IMcticn for
Summary Disposition.

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins

3.90
0,00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

780.C

11951
TIME
Jensen
Appeals
5/13/2002
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Appeals Activity: telephone call from Court
of Appeals re possibility of mediation n this
case.

0.4(j
0.00
0.00
0 no

J . 0.00
T@1

80.

12584
TIME
Jensen
9/25/2002
Aopeals
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: receive from Judge Uever
his denial of Motion to Augment; telcon with
Clerk of the Supreme Court; draft and file

1.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.0C
T®1

300.

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
11599
TiME
2/27/2002
WIP
r
Appeals Activity: draft a nd file Notice c
Apoeal

User
Activity
Client
Reference
Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 BI- MM »

"

8/9/2004
3:38 PM

SHp ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
Notice of Appeal on Judge Dever's Order;
draft and file Motion to Consolidate and for
New Briefing Schedule.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
Reference

12772
TIME
Jensen
10/18/2002
Appeals
WlP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: receive telephone call from
Court of Appeals; draft and file with
Supreme Court a Motion to Pour Over.
Jensen
12773
TIME
1V8J2002
Appeals
WlP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: telephone call from
Supreme Court re docketing statement;
receive and review Motion to Dismiss from
Dunn.

Page

Units
DNB Time
E s t Time
Variance

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

100.00

0.20

200.00
T@1

40.00

D.DO

0.00
0.00

Jensen
12774
TIME
11/11/2002
Appeals
WlP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: draft Docketing Statement
for second appeal; draft Response to Motion
h Dismiss.

2.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

440.00

12775
TIME
11/12/2002
WlP
Appeals Activity: obtain from trial court a
cjate-stamped copy of Notice of Appeal.

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

40.00

12776
TIME
11/13/2002
WJP
Appeals Activity: file Docketing Statement
3nd Response to Motion to Dismiss; mail
Same to Dunn.

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Bleyjns

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

40.00

Jensen
13513
TIME
Appeals
1/17/2003
WlP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: obtain Indexed Court File.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

40.00

Jensen
13214
TIME
Appeals
3/20/2003
Custom3 Blevins
WlP
Appeals Activity: review Rule 22(c); draft
^nd file Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of

0.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

80.00

2

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

8/9/2004
8:38 PM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
Time; ma*! cooy to opposing counsel

User
Activity
Client
Reference

13322
TIME
Jensen
3/4/2003
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Appeals Activity: continue drafting on Brief;
review Rules for briefs; review Record and
select various documents for copies and to
possibly include in Addendum; discover that
Record is missing documents fiied after July
2002; telephone conference with Court of
Appeals; draft and file Motion to Supplement
Record and Stay Briefing; return Record to
Trial Court C'erk.

P:nV

3

Siin 1

Units
DNBTime
Est. Time
Variance

Rate
Rate Info
Bsli Status

5.80
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

1160.00

0.10

200.00
T@1

20 00

14133
TIME
8/18/2003
H\P
Appeals Activity: visit with Clerk or tl
Appeals Court to check on status of
Supplemental Index.

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins

1^-270
TIME
9/13/2003
WIP
Appeals Activity: work on Brief

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins

2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00

200,00
T@1

480.00

1*1271

Jensen
Appeals

6.80
0.00
0.00
0 00

200.00
T@1

1360,00

4.60
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

920.00

10.20
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

2040.CO

200.00
T@1

540.00

TIME

9/15/2003
WIP
Appeals Act'/ity* work on Brief

Custcm3 BIPVTIS

1^289
TiME
Jensen
9/19/2003
Appeals
Customs Rlpvins
WIP
Appeals Activity: continue VVGTK on Brief, edit
and revise Brief.
14290
TiME
9/21/2003
WIP
Appeals Activity, finalize drart of Bne; and
continue editing and revision process;
prepare Mdendurns.

Jensen
Appeal
Custom3 Blevins

14291
TiME
9/22/2003
WIP
Appeals Activity: make final edits and

Jensen
Appeals
Customs Pif" ins

o.co
0.00
0.00

coo

2 70
0 00
0 00
0 00

8/9/2004
8:S8 PM

Slip ID
Dates and Time
Posting Status
Description
revisions in preparation of printing and
binding; arrange for printing and binding;
return record to trial court clerk; file Briefs
with Court of Appeals; mail copies of Briefs
to Blevins.

Michael A. Jensen
Slip Listing

User
Activity
Client
Reference

Page

Units
DNB Time
Est. Time
Variance

Rate
Rate Info
Bill Status

Slip Value

14484
TIME
Jensen
10/25/2003
Appeals
WiP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: read and review Appellees'
Brief; research cases cited; draft Reply Brief.

2.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00

440.00

14523
TIME
Jensen
Appeals
10/30/2003
Custom3 Blevins
WIP
Appeals Activity: file Reply Brief with Court
of Appeals.

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

2QO.Q0

15598
TIME
Jensen
6/14/2004
Appeals
WIP
Custom3 Blevins
Appeals Activity: receive and review
Memorandum Decision from Court of
Appeals; review Rules on Petition for
Rehearing; telephone conference with Clerk
of Court of Appeals re Petition.

0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00

15599
TIME
6/21/2004
WIP
Appeals Activity: research other cases
recently issued by Court; draft Petition for
Rehearing; arrange for printing.

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins

1.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

300.00

TIME
156QQ
6/23/2004
WiP
Appeals Activity: file with Court of Appeals
tne Petition for Rehearing, including all
copies; mail copies to Blevins.

Jensen
Appeals
Custom3 Blevins

0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00

200.00
T@1

40.00

T@1

4Q.0Q

T@1

60.00

T@1

Grand Total
Billable
Unomable
Total

51.00
0.00
51.00

10200.00
0.00
10200.00
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS vs.

JOHN DOES I-X

CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
L A DEVER
PARTIES
Plain:irr
STEVrtl (, FEBRA BLEVINS
SANDY, UT 84 0 94
Plaintiff - DEBRA KAY BLEVINS
Sandy, UT 84G94
Defendant -

CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION INC

Defendant -

CONTRACTING FABRICATION

Defendant: - RANDY ISAACSON
SLC, UT 84107
Defendant - LINDA I ISAACSON
SLC, UT 84107
Defendan

^,1^. b u n h

Defendant - JASON BISHOP
SLC, UT 84107
Defendant - WENDY GARAMSNBI
SLC, UT 84107
Represented by: MICHAEL A JENSEN
Defendant - MARK CARAMENDI
Defendant:

TORN DOES I-X

ACCOUNT SUMMARY
Amount Due;
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:
BAIL/CASH BONDS
Posted:
AcDlied:

431.50
481.50
0.00
3, 00

TOTAL REVENUE

Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:15

6,350.00
0 . 01

Paae 1
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
Forfeited:
Balance:

6, 350 00
0 00

Trust Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Trust Balance Due:
Balance Payable:

6 350 00
6, 350 00
0 00
0 00
0 .00

TALS

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Amount Due
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit
Balance

80.00
8 0.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

190.00
190.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT
Amount Due:
20.00
Amount Paid:
20.00
Amount Credit;
Q.Q0
Balance:
0.00
190.00
190.00
0.03
0.00

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.50
0.50
0.00
0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By: MICHAEL A JENSEN
Posted:
300.00

Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:26
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0,,00
300..00
0 00

Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

BAIL/CASK BOND DETAI
JETAIL - TY PE: CASI-I BOND- Civ:.1 11 X
Posted 3y
S'IEVEN & DEBRA BLEV:INS
Posted.
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance.

6, 050 .00
0 .00
6, 050 .00
0 .03

TRUST DETAIL
Trast Description: Bail/Bond kerand
Recipient: MICHAEL A JENSEN
Amount Due:
6,050.00
Paid In:
6,050.00
Paid Out.
6,05 0 00
TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Bail/Bend Reiund
Recipient: MICHAEL A JENSEN
Amount Due:
3 0 0.00
Paid In:
300.00
Paid Cut:
300 CO
CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
08-03
08-03
08-03
08-03
08-03

-00
-00
-00
-00
•00

10-20-00
10-2 0-00
02-06-01
02-06-01
02-06-01
02-06-01
02-21-01

Case filed by mckaem
Judge DEVER assigned.
Filed: Complaint 2K-10K
Fee Account created
Payment Received.
J] Z
COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Filed: Motion to dismiss, to strike or for more definite
statement
Filed: memorandum in support of motions
Filed: motion for partial summary judgment en the first cause
cf action
Filed, memorandum in support cf mcnicn fcr partial summary
judgment on the first cause of action
Filed: affidavit of atty Richard W. Perkins
Filed: Notice to submit for decision on 1. Motion to dismiss 2.
Motion to strike; and 3. Motion for a more definite statement
Filed: Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs first cause of action
onlv

Printed. 12 04 ;C4 U .3 25

Page 3

CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
02-21-01 Filed. Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendants' motion for
partial simmary judgment on plaintiffs' first cause of action
only
02-22-01 Filed, Notice to Submit: for Decision on Motion for Partial

http://168.I77.2P 52/casesearch/CaseSearch?actioiv

Summary Judgment on the First Cause of Action
04-09-01 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY
Judge: L. A. DEVER
Clerk: rayd
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss; Motion to Strike, Motion for a More
Definite Statement and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came
before the Court pursuant to U.R.C.P. Pules 12-13, and Rule 4-501of
the UCJA, Having read the motions and the memoranda filed
therewith, the Court enters the following ruling: Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants Custdm
Steel Fabrication, Inc, Mark Garamendi, and Heidi Eishop is
GRANTED. As to the Motions to Strike and for a More Definite
Statement, Defendants' concerns expressed in the Memorandum in
Support have been considered, and although unopposed, these Motions
seek relief in the form of information which can be obtained
through discovery, and are hereby DENIED. As there is no objection
to Defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it is hereby
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is Dismissed.
Attorney for Defendant to Prepare an Order Consistent with this
Minute Entry.

Judge L. A. DEVER
04-11-01
04-11-01
04-11-01
04-11-01
04-12-01
04-12-01
04-12-01

04-20-01
04-23-01
04-23-01
04-23-01
04-23-01
04-23-01

Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:

Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
Filed:
deft's
04-23-01 Filed:

notice of change of address
motion for attorney fees
memorandum in support of motion for attorney fees
affidavit of attorney's fees (Michael A. Jensen)
motion for scheduling conference and scheduling order
certificate of service
Answer
RANDY ISAACSON
LINDA I ISAACSON
WENDY GARAMENDI
objection to form of order
deft's objection to plf's objection to form of order
amended motion for atty fees
amended affidavit of atty fees (Michael A. Jensen)
ex parte motion for enlargement of time for response
memorandum of points and authorities in saupport of
ex parte motion for enlargement of time
affidavit of counsel in support of plf's motion for

Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:28
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
enlargement of time
04-23-01 Filed order: Order Granting Enlargement of Time
Judge shenriod
Signed April 23, 2001
04-27-01 Filed:- motion to reinstate claims
04-27-01 Filed: memorandum of points and authorities in support of
defts' motion to reinstate claims
04-30-01 Filed: response to objection to objection to form of order,

http://163.177.2U 52/casesearcliCaseScarch?action=c...

response to motion to assess fees, objection to second form of
order and reply in support of objection to form of order
05-02-01 Filed order: Order and Judgment on partial dismissal and on
partial summary judgment
Judge ldever
Signed May 02, 2CC1
G5-0--J- Ldse Disposition is Dismsd w/ prejudice
debbiep
Disposition Judge is L A DEVER
debbiep
05-03-01 Filed: certificate of service of response to defendants'
initial discovery requests
05-07-01 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decisiono CD'jections co Form cf
Order
05-07-01 Filed: Defendant's Memorandam in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule
59 Motion to Reinstate Claims
05-07-01 Filed: Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to
Amended Form of Order and To Motion to Assess Fees
05-07-31 Filed: Second Amended Motion for Attorney Fees
05-07-01 Filed: Second Amended affidavit of attorney's fees (Michael A.
Jensen)
05-14-01 Filed: reply memorandum m supporc of irccicn cc reinstate
claims
05-14-01 Filed: notice to submit: motion to reinstate claims
05-18-01 Filed: response to second amended motion for fees
05-13-01 Minute Entry - DEFT'S 2ND AMENDED MOTION FOR ATTY FEES
Judge: L. A. DEVER
Clerk: debbiep
On order of Judge Dever, Deft's second amended motion for atty fees
is granted. Deft's motion for atty fees is granted in the sum of
$1330.00. c/o atty for deft to prepare order for the court to sign.
Clerk sent a copy of this decision to all parties by mail.
05-21-Dl Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of their second
amended motion for atty fees
05-22-01 Filed: certificate of service o: pl^'c mil „ai discovery
requests
05-24-21 Filed: deft's Mot: on tor pn'"ial Summary Judgment: on the second
cause of action
35-24-01 Filed: deft's memorandum in support cf Motion for partial
Summary Judgment on the second cause of action
05-24-01 Filed: response to motion for partial summary judgment
Re:second cause of action
35-30-01 Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of motion for partial

Printed: 12/04/34 11:23:31
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CASE NUMBER 000906C72 Contrite
summary judgment on the second cause cf action
05-30-G1 Filed: notice to submit for decision
05-30-01 Filed: Defendants' reply memorandum in support cf notion "~ *
partial summary judgment on second cause of action
05-31-31 Note: Per phone call from Atty Mike Jensen, clerk set tnis case
for a telephone scheduling conference en 6/20/2001 at 9:00 a.m.
Notices mailed to both attorneys
05-31-31 TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on June 20, 2001 ac 09:00
AM in Third Floor - W3 7 with Judge DEVER.
05-31-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 85039TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. is scheduled
Date: 06/20/2001

http://l 68.177.211 ^2/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: L. A. DEVER
**This case is set for a TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE** per
Motion filed on 4/12/2001**
06-20-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF.
Judge:
L. A. DEVER
Clerk:
kathrynb
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD L DUNN
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A JENSEN
Video
Tape Number:
OFF TAPE

HEARING

06-27-01
07-12-01
08-15-01
08-20-01
08-20-01
08-20-01

The Court sets cut-off dates:
Discovery is due by 8/15/2001
Motions are due by 8/31/2001
Depositive Motions are due by 9/14/2001
Filed: Certificate of Service
Filed: certificate of service of deft'a second discovery
requests
Filed: certificate of service of response to Defendant's second
discovery requests
Filed: Motion for partial Summary Judgment
Filed: memorandum in support of P l f s Motion for partial
Summary Judgment
Filed: affidavit in support of p l f s Motion for partial Summary

Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:33
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
Judgment
08-29-01 Filed: Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the
Third and Fourth Causes of Action (Hearing Requested)
08-29-01 Filed: Defendant's memorandum in support of motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action
08-30-01 Filed: Defendant's motion to strike Hearsay Testimony of Steven
Blevins,
(Hearing Requested)
08-30-01 Filed: Defendant's memorandum in support of motion to strike
Hearsay Testimony of Steven Blevins (hearing requested)
08-31-01 Filed: Defendants' memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment on the Third Cause of
Action
09-06-01 MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on October 30, 2001 at 02:00
PM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
09-06-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 914384
MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is scheduled.

~ll,J

http://168.177.211 52/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=c..

Date: 10/30/2001
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Third Floor - S35
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: L. A. DEVER
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not
be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing of
manifest injustice. Counsel ar% iskpfcructed to stay in contact with
the Clerk as the trial date approaches regarding dates.
**This hearing is for arguments on deft's motion for partial
Summary Judgment on the 2nd Cause of Action**
09-06-01 Filed: Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's notice to
submit for decision on un-responded motion
09-13-01 Filed: response to deft's motion to strike Paragraph 13 of
affidavit of Steven Blevins
09-13-01 Filed: reply memorandum in support of plf's motion for partial
summary judgment
09-14-01 Filed: response to Defendants' motion for motion for partial
summary judgment
09-21-01 Filed: Notice to submit for decision on deft's Motion for
Partial summary Judgment on the third and fourth causes of
action
09-21-01 Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of Motion to Strike
hearsay testimony of Steven Blevins
09-21-01 Filed: notice to submit for decision on deft's Motion for
Motion to strike hearsay testimony of Steven Blevins
09-21-01 Filed: request for hearing on all pending motions
09-21-01 Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the third and fourth causes of action

Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:34
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
09-27-01 Filed: notice to submit for decision on Defendants' motion to
strike Plaintiff's notice to submit for decision on
un-responded motion
10-16-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 939844
MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Date: 11/30/2001
Time: 11:15 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - S35
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84111-1860
B'efore Judge: L. A. DEVER
The reason for the change is On court's own motion
**This case has been Rescheduled due to a high profile case which
takes precedence**
10-16-01 MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on November 30, 2001 at
11:15 AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
10-17-01 Filed: Notice of hearing
10-29-01 Filed: Motion for continuance of or rescheduling hearing
11-09-01 Filed: reply affidavit in support of Plf's Motion for Partial

*1ln

http.//I68.177.211 52/casescarch/CaseSearch?action=

Summary Judgment
11-13-01 Note: LAD/KB Atty Michael Jensen appeared and stated that his
Motion for Continuance may be cancelled. Nov, 30, 2001 at
11:15 a.m. will be fine with him. He will file a motion to
withdraw the motion.
11-13-01 Filed: Withdrawal of Motion for Continuance
11-19-01 Filed: Defts' amended motion to strike hearsay testimony of
Steven Blevms
11-19-01 Filed: Amended withdrawal of motion foe continuance
11-28-01 Filed: notice of automatic stay
11-30-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
kathrynb
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD L DUNN
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MICHAEL A JENSEN
Video
Tape Number:
11/3 0/2001
Tape Count: 11:25:52

HEARING
This case came before the Court on Defense Motions for Summary
Judgment on 2nd Cause of Action
The Court heard from Atty Dunn and Atty Jensen regarding issues
that need to be addressed today.
The Court finds that the only issue pending are cross-motions for
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
Summary Judgment on 3rd Cause of Action and Motion to Strike
The Court heard oral arguments from Atty Ronald Dunn for the
Plaintiff and Atty Jensen for the Defendant.
The Court Rules: No Claim for offset
Further arguments heard
The Court rules that Good Faith and Fair Dealing are dismissed,
reasonable attorney fees are awarded.
12-07-01 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (Michael A. Jensen)
12-19-01 Filed: affidavit of R. Brent Stephens
12-19-01 Filed: objection to proposed order and objection to atty's fees
and demand for evidentiary hearing
12-26-01 Filed: Amended Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (Michael A. Jensen)
12-26-01 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision on Defendants' Order and
Judgment and Affidavit of Attorney Fees
12-26-01 Filed: Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to
Attorney Fees
01-17-02 Minute Entry - RULING ON DEFENDANTS' ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Judge: L A DEVER
Clerk: kathrynb
The Court denies Defendant's Order and Judgment and Affidavit of
Attorney Fees. No original documents on the Judgment or Affidavits
on Attorneys Fees have been submitted to the Court.
02-01-02 Filed order: FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Judge ldever

11*5

http://168.177.2il 52/cascsearch/CaseSearch?actiou=

Signed February 01, 2002
Note: Clerk entered certificate of mailing
Fee Account created
Total Due:
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
Filed: Judgment Information Sheet @J
Issued: Supplemental Order
Judge L A DEVER
Hearing Date: March 05, 2002
02-12-02 Judgment #1 Entered
Creditor: CONTRACTING FABRICATION
Creditor: CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION INC
Debtor:
STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS
Debtor:
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS
Creditor: HEIDI BISHOP
Creditor: JASON BISHOP
Creditor: LINDA I ISAACSON
Creditor: MARK GARAMENDI
Creditor: RANDY ISAACSON
Creditor: WENDY GARAMENDI
6,050.00 Attorneys Fee's
6,050.00 Judgment Grand Total
02-12-02 Filed judgment: Final Order and Judgment @J
Judge Idever
Signed February 01, 2002
02-27-02 Filed: Notice of Appeal

02-01-02
02-04-02
02-04-02
02-05-02
02-05-02
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
02-27-02 Fee Account created
Total Due:
190.00
02-27-02 APPEAL
Payment Received:
190.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
02-2 8-02 Note: Cert, copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to Supreme Court
03-01-02 Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
03-01-02 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
03-08-02 Filed return: Supp Order on return
Party Served BLEVINS, STEVEN
Service Type Personal
Service Date March 04, 2002
03-08-02 Filed: certificate that transcript is not required
03-12-02 SUPP ORDER scheduled on March 19, 2002 at 02:00 PM in Third
Floor - W3 2 with Judge DEVER.
03-18-02 SUPP ORDER rescheduled on March 28, 2002 at 02:00 PM
Reason: Plaintiff requested continuance.
03-26-02 SUPP ORDER scheduled on April 02, 2002 at 02:00 PM in Third
Floor - W3 2 with Judge DEVER.
03-29-02 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash
Supplemental Order - Hearing and Expedited Disposition
Requested
03-29-02 Filed: Certificate of Service
04-01-02 Filed: Motion to Quash Supplemental Order and Memorandum in
Support Thereof
04-02-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Supplemental Order
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
janetr
PRESENT

http://168.177.211 S2/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=
Plaintiff's
Defendant's
Video

Attorney(s)
Attorney(s)

RONALD L DUNN
MICHAEL A JENSEN

HEARING

Attys for both parties present. Supp order was heard before Judge
Medley. Judge Medley orders Bail set at $200/ however, execution
is stayed pending resolution before Judge Dever. Atty Michael
Jensen will prepare the order.
04-03-02 Filed: certificate of service of Plaintiff's initial discovery
requests (post-judgment)
04-04-02 Issued: Garnishment (us bank) filed non-wage application
04-04-02 Fee Account created
Total Due:
20.00
04-04-02 GARNISHMENT
Payment Received:
20.00
Note: Code Description: GARNISHMENT
04-05-02 Filed: Notice of hearing on plf's motion to quash supplemental
proceedings
04-05-02 Filed: deft's motion for protective order
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
04-05-02 Filed: deft's memorandum in support of their motion for
protective order
04-05-02 Note: LAD/KB
Per phone call from Atty Michael Lewis, clerk
cleared date of 4/12/2002 at 10:45 am for the expedited
hearing.
Atty Lewis will send notices.
04-05-02 MOTION TO QUASH SUP ORDER scheduled on April 12, 2002 at 10:45
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
04-11-02 Bond Account created
Total Due:
6050.,00
6,050.00
04-11-02 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
04-11-02 Issued: $200 Bench Warrant
Clerk karries
04-12-02 Issued: Supplemental Order
Judge L A DEVER
Hearing Date: May 07, 2002
Time: 02:00
04-12-02 Filed: Motion to Augment Judgment
04-12-02 Filed: First Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to
the Collection of Judgment
04-12-02 Filed order: ORDER FORFEITING BOND
Judge Idever
Signed April 12, 2002
04-12-02 Filed: answer of garnishee (no funds)
04-12-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO QUASH SUP ORDER
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
kathrynb
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD L DUNN
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A JENSEN
Video
Tape Number:
4/12/2002
Tape Count: 10:47:06

~YT
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HEARING
Atty Dunn reports that the Bankrupcy filed was dismissed Wednesday
of this week. Plaintiff's Motion, therefore, is moot.
A Notice of Appeal was filed yesterday and Atty believes that the
Appeal was not filed in good faith.
The Court heard arguments from both counsel regarding the
supercedious bond.
After hearing arguments of counsel and referring to the applicable
Rules, the Court finds in favor of Defense.
The Court denies request of Atty Dunn representing the Plaintiffs.
The Court enters Order Forfeiting Bond.
04-16-02 Filed return: Writ of Garnishment (not for garnishment of
earnings for personal services or wages)
Party Served: Stephanie Alfrey, authorized employ
Service Type: Personal
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Service Date: April 05, 2002
04-22-02 Filed: withdrawal of post-judgment discovery requests
04-23-02 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court - Order - Case transferred to
Court of Appeals
04-25-02 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - Case assigned to Court of
Appeals - Cca#20020177-ca
04-30-02 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
05-01-02 Trust Account created
Total Due:
6050.00
05-01-02 Bond Transfer/Refund
Payment Received:
-6,050.00
05-01-02 Bail/Bond Refund
Payment Received:
6,050.00
05-01-02 Note:
05-01-02 Bail/Bond Refund Check #
25290 Trust Payout:
6,050.00
05-03-02 Filed: Response to deft's Motion re late-filed response
05-03-02 Filed: objection to form as order and notice to submit re:
Defendant's motion to augment judgment
05-07-02 Filed: response to plfs' objections to form of order
05-08-02 Note: **JUDGE DEVER DENIED SIGNING THE FIRST ORDER AND JUDGMENT
TO AUGMENT ORIGINAL JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY ATTY MICHAEL JENSEN**
05-14-02 Filed: Indexed: Cert/Copy of Index sent to Court of Appeals Coa#20020177-ca
05-15-02 Note: Record: Files-2 sent up to Court of Appeals Coa#20020177-ca
05-2 9-02 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash and Request for
Hearing (Copy)
05-30-02 Filed: Motion to Quash Bench Warrant (Copy)
06-03-02 Filed return: Bench Warrant on return
Party Served: BLEVINS, STEVEN
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 24, 2002
06-03-02 BENCH WARRANT scheduled on June 04, 2002 at 02:00 PM in Third
Floor - W3 2 with Judge DEVER.
06-04-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
janetr
PRESENT

http://168.177.21] 52/casescarch/CaseSearch?action=
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A JENSEN

HEARING
Pla present, Def not present. Court orders a $3 00 Bench Warrant
to be issued.
06-12-02 Filed; defts' memorandum in opposition
to plfs' motion to quash
06-12-02 Filed: Notice to submit Motion to Quash
06-12-02 Filed: reply memorandum in support of Motion to quash Bench
Warrant
06-13-02 Minute Entry - MOTION TO QUASH BENCH WARRANT
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CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts
Judge: L A DEVER
Clerk: darlac
The Plaintiff's motion to Quash Bench Warrant is granted.
for Plaintiff to prepare order.

Attorney

Judge L A DEVER
07-09-02 Filed order: Order quashing Bench Warrant
Judge Idever
Signed July 08, 2002
08-20-02 Note: Files returned to 3rd District Appeals for Sup. Index - 2
volumes
08-26-02 Note: Supplemental Index done - cert, copy forwarded to Court
of Appeals
09-23-02 Filed order: Denial of first Order and Judgment to augment
original judgment
Judge Idever
Signed September 22, 2002
09-25-02 Filed: Notice of Appeal
09-25-02 Fee Account created
Total Due:
190.00
09-25-02 APPEAL
Payment Received:
190.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
10-01-02 Note: Cert/copy of Notice of Appeal on Post-Judgment Order
forwarded to Supreme Court
10-07-02 Note: Cert, copy of Notice of Appeal (2nd NOA; filed 02/27/02)
forwarded to Supreme Court
10-16-02 Filed: Supreme Court letter to Michael A. Jensen (SC #
20020824-SC) - Appeal received by Supreme Court
10-18-02 £iled: Certificate that Transcript is Not Required
10-18-02 Note; Cert, copy of Certificate
that Transcript
is Not Required
forwarded to Supreme Court
12-11-02 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court - Order - Case transferred to
Supreme Court
12-17-02 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to Michael A. Jensen (COA #
20020824-CA) - case assigned to Court of Appeals
12-23-02 Filed: Court of Appeals Order (COA # 20020177) - motion to
consolidate granted. Cases will now be consolidated under COA

"l-i-
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# 20020177-CA
Filed: Notice of withdrawal of counsel
Filed: Notice of withdrawal of counsel
Filed. Letter from Court of Appeals - Coa#20020177-ca - Ordei
Note. 2nd Supplemental Index. Cert/Copy of 2nd Suppl Index
sent to Court of Appeals - Coa#20020177-ca
07-28-03 Filed: Order signed by Judge Thorne from Court of Appeals
12-30-03 Note: Record forwarded to Court of Appeals. 2 files
10-07-04 Note: Remittitur: reversed & remanded. 2 files returned.

03-19-03
03-20-03
03-25-03
07-21-03
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Remittitur forwarded to Dave Shewell.
Filed: Remittitur - remanded @J
Filed: verified bill of costs
Filed: Request for scheduling conference
Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 6086705
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 11/12/2004
Time: 09:15 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - S35
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: L A DEVER
10-15-04 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on November 12, 2004 at 09:15
AM m Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
10-18-04 Filed: Motion to Reset Date for Scheduling Conference
10-19-04 Filed order: Order on Motion to reset date for Scheduling
Conference
Judge Idever
Signed October 19, 2004
10-19-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 6089769
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE.
Date- 11/19/2004
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - S35
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: L A DEVER
The reason for the change is ATD requested continuance.
10-19-04 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on November 19, 2004 at 09:00
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER,
10-21-04 Filed: Ob]ection to Request for Judgment for Verified Bil of
Costs
10-22-04 Note **Order is not signed-Counsel to wait for hearing on
il/19/04**
10-27-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
10-27-04 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.50
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
11-19-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
rhondam
PRESENT

10-07-04
10-08-04
10-08-04
10-15-04
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Plaintiff(s); STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS
Defendant's Attorney (s) ; MICHAEL A JENSEN
Video
Tape Number:
Disk 012
Tape Count: 9:03-9:13
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HEARING
This case is before the Court for a Scheduling Conference.
Attorney for the defendant addresses the Court with issues that are
pending on this case. The Court finds their are no facts to this
case and directs defendants attorney to submit a memorandum.
The Memmorandum brief to be submitted within 3 weeks. At that
time plaintiff is to respond to defendant's memorandum within 10
days. When ready to review a notice to submit is to be filed for
the court to rule. Bill of costs stayed till decision.
Court will sign order to release appeals bond in this case.
11-19-04 Filed order: Order to Refund Appeals Bond
Judge Idever
Signed November 19, 2004
11-19-04 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal
11-19-04 Trust Account created
Total Due:
300.00
11-19-04 Bond Transfer/Refund
Payment Received:
-300.00
11-19-04 Bail/Bond Refund
Payment Received:
300.00
11-23-04 Bail/Bond Refund Check #
34346 Trust Payout:
300.00
11-23-04 Filed: Check #0034346 for $300.00 mailed to Michael A. Jensen,
136 south main St. PO BOX 571708 St 430 SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84157-1708
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